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This thesis explores the U.S. eroding global military advantage in light of the current 
changing security environment. First, I examine the process and type of erosion taking place. I 
expand the existing debate and show that the erosion is not defined in monetary terms but in terms 
of the declining U.S influence within the established rule-based international order. Secondly, I 
use China and Russia as case-studies to define the present geopolitical rivalries and the 
(re)emergence of revisionist powers. Both China and Russia aim to shape the emerging 
international order and threaten the U.S. national security with the increased inter-state 
competition. Thirdly, I employ the techniques of discourse, document and graph analyses to draw 
conclusions about the various factors contributing to the erosion.  
These factors can be divided into two broad categories: the categories of internal and 
external factors. The internal factors encompass the U.S force posture in terms of its hardline 
policies as well as the increased concentration within the U.S military industrial complex which 
curbs competition and innovation and leads to controlled government contracts and the 
prioritization of corporate interests over national security interests. The external factors include 
the present global “disorder” characterized by inter-state competition, mainly Russia’s military 
advancement in the global defense industry and China’s expansionist economic and military 
agenda. China’s case-study concludes that its Belt Road Initiative is used as an economic tool for 
military expansion into various regions of Asia, Middle East and Africa. On the other hand, 
Russia’s case-study makes the connection between its increased market share in the global defense 
industry hampering U.S defense corporations’ arms sales and its challenge to the U.S influence in 




arms sales, it also seeks to impact the future of the U.S. relationship with NATO, which contains 
military implications for Europe as well as for the global order. 
  Lastly, this thesis analyzes the shifting of alliances and the process of the formation of a 
new-world order in which the U. S. military superiority is at stake. It concludes that there is a way 
back for the United States to restore and sustain its global military edge based on the framework 
defined in my research. The findings and strategies outlined for restoration are subject to certain 













Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
List of Figures............................................................................................................................. 5 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 7 
Global Military Advantage ........................................................................................................10 
Chapter 2: Literature Review .....................................................................................................12 
New International Order ...........................................................................................................14 
Erosion of Global Military Advantage ........................................................................................16 
Risk Factors Affecting America’s Industrial Base ........................................................................21 
Trends in U.S Global Defense Activities......................................................................................24 
Sustaining and Enhancing the U.S Military’s Technological Edge .................................................26 
Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................................................30 
Limitations ..............................................................................................................................30 
Chapter 4: Case-studies .............................................................................................................32 
A. China ..............................................................................................................................33 
China’s Defense Policy 2010 .................................................................................................34 
China’s Defense Policy 2014 .................................................................................................35 
China’s Defense Policy 2019 – In the New Era ........................................................................37 




Defense Posture ...................................................................................................................39 
The Belt Road Initiative –An Undercover Economic-Military Project .........................................40 
China’s Regional Military Expansion .....................................................................................44 
1. Asia .............................................................................................................................44 
2. Middle East ..................................................................................................................49 
3. Africa – Djibouti ...........................................................................................................56 
B. Russia ................................................................................................................................60 
1. Turkey .........................................................................................................................66 
2. India ............................................................................................................................73 
Chapter 5: Analysis ...................................................................................................................81 
I. Implication of China’s military expansion ............................................................................81 
II. Implication of Russia’s Military Expansion ..........................................................................85 
What the Russian arms offer that the U.S arms do not? ...........................................................87 
Chapter 6: Causes of The Erosion of U.S Military Advantage ......................................................89 
a. Force posture; the problem of sanctions and too many strings attached with military sales ...........90 
b. Internal competition in United States Defense Industry ..........................................................92 
Chapter 8: Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 107 








List of Figures  
Figure 1: Russian and Chinese Military Spending 1998-2015 ............................................................18 
Figure 2: China's Gross Domestic Growth (post joining WTO) .........................................................23 
Figure 3: Stock of China’s Outbound Direct Investment (ODI) 2010-2014 .........................................38 
Figure 4: Arms Exported from China 2007-2018 .............................................................................41 
Figure 5: Chinese Investment in MENA Countries ..........................................................................42 
Figure 6: Belt Road Initiative Global Investment .............................................................................43 
Figure 7: Chinese Arms Exports to Asia 2008-2017 .........................................................................46 
Figure 8: OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2018 ...................................................................49 
Figure 9: Exports to China from MENA Countries; .........................................................................51 
Figure 10: Share of Total Global Arms Exports 2000-2016 ...............................................................62 
Figure 11: Russia’s share of global exports in selected categories of weapon systems ..........................63 
Figure 12: Russian weapons sales 2010-2018 ..................................................................................65 
Figure 13: Turkey's Financial Value of National Arms Exports 2009-2017 .........................................67 
Figure 14: Turkey weapons supplier share by value .........................................................................69 
Figure 15: Share of world military expenditure of the 15 countries ....................................................74 
Figure 16: Russia's Arms Exports to India 2008-2018 ......................................................................75 
Figure 17: Trend of US and Russian Imports to India 2013-2018 .......................................................78 
Figure 18: Military Expenditure (USA-China; 1989-2018) ...............................................................84 
Figure 19: Changes in volume of major arms exports since 2009-2013 by the 10 largest exporters in 2014-
2018 ..........................................................................................................................................85 
Figure 20: Top Ten Defense Companies Arms Sales 2017 ................................................................93 







I embarked on this part of my professional journey, pursuing the degree of Master’s in 
International Studies inspired, supported and gifted by my father’s wisdom, knowledge and 
lifetime investment in shaping me into who I am today. I owe a great intellectual debt to my father 
whose political ideas and insight has greatly influenced my research. Furthermore, I am forever 
indebted to my mother for always having faith in me and for the values she taught me.  
It is a pleasure to express my sincerest gratitude to Professor Filip Kovacevic for extending 
his support and priceless assistance throughout the course of my degree and thesis. A special thank 
you for encouraging me to address such a critical and sensitive topic. It has been a great learning 
experience to work under your supervision, and further gain understanding regarding geopolitics 
and intelligence studies. I also wish to thank the University of San Francisco, the master’s in 
international studies program and the entire faculty. Especially Professor Olivier Berault and 
Professor Lucia Cantero for being exemplary and visionary mentors.  
Lastly, I dedicate this thesis and research to my father; Mr. Munib Ahmed, in gratitude for 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The globalized defense industrial complex has existed over decades with thriving 
American dominance. The current high rise of inter-state competition is a relatively new 
phenomenon. The United States is the number one military spender, and thus its global influence, 
cohesion among allies and partners, economic prosperity and national security are all strategically 
interlinked. The changing international order defined by shifts has developed complex challenges 
for the United States national security and global influence. This research’s main purpose is to 
analyze America’s eroding global military advantage being challenged. It reviews its path to 
restoring its global military competitive edge. The main contribution made to the existing literature 
is whether the United States will be able to restore its global military power or not. In the case that 
it can be successful what strategies can be adopted to regain its monopoly within the global defense 
market. The significance of whether the U.S can regain its uncontested power is not only a matter 
of concern for the national security of America but, also interests researchers and other countries 
since it defines the rules of the game within the international politics for the future.         
The United States defense industrial base has various functions to perform and has a critical 
aspect in terms of economic output and national security. It not only provides support to economic 
prosperity for the U.S but also yields global competition amongst states. But recently the industrial 
base has been facing multiple challenges in the form of uncertainty in government spending, shifts 
in the global market, aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations and loss of vital skills in 
the domestic workforce.  The 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledges a healthy defense 




base but, at the same time expands the debate about how the manufacturing and defense industrial 
base is under threat. 1 
For decades the United States has enjoyed its dominance in the global order. This 
dominance was primarily characterized by the exercise of military power in terms of arms 
production and trade. Within this imperial grand strategy, the United States was the most powerful 
actor in maintaining its hegemony through military power and establishing a unipolar world order 
whereby, it had no other peer competitor.  2 On the contrary, it now faces various challenges within 
the global security order as China’s economic and military expansion is at its peak. Despite 
America maintaining its dominance to quite an extent, China has managed to dominate the region 
side-by-side too creating a multipolarity whereby both powers are operating at the front wicket. 
This military challenge is accompanied by economic expansion in terms of heavy trade and 
investment by China. Not only does the United States face its global military dominance being 
challenged in but with China’s economic dominance a dual-hierarchy has been established at the 
global scale. 
This changing strategic environment for the United States is countered by China and 
Russia; both competing with the United States global positioning. With an end of the INF treaty, 
the future for U.S-Russian strategic stability is in question too. The country is no longer under the 
obligation of arms control agreements and can operate freely. In terms of competing with United 
States military domination, Russia is not too far behind either. While the United States share of 
 
1 "Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense ..." Accessed June 7, 2019.  





major arms exports comprises of 36%, Russia stands at 21%. 3 A dominant pattern to observe that 
has various implications for the United States is that despite Russia’s declining sales over the past 
five years it remains the second-largest arms exporter. Moreover, it has various programs running 
to modernize their weapons and further boost its weapons industry as well. 
The shift from a unipolar world order to a multipolar stage is faced by various competitors 
challenging the United States military industrial base and expanding their own global market share. 
This shift and fear of losing more dominance is evident in the United States National Defense 
Strategy too, which itself has experienced changes over the past two decades. The official rhetoric 
of the National Defense strategy of 2002 draws a picture representing how the strength of U.S 
forces restrict other countries from maximizing their military power. But on the other hand, as 
compared to the National Defense Strategy of 2018 the rise of fear is evident within the U.S policy. 
The report states that the United States is facing a global disorder which has also further caused a 
challenge for its long-standing international order and more importantly, the erosion of its military 
advantage too. The acknowledgement of the complex global security order by the U.S National 
Defense Strategy raises various questions regarding the future actions of the once global power 
and its various implications for military power and arms trade. 4 
 
 
3 Abramson, Jeff. "U.S. Leads Rising Global Arms Trade."  
 







Considering these shifts, this study examines the United States eroding global military 
advantage and whether there is a way back. It covers a genealogy of the established power 
regarding the globalization of the defense industrial complex and the changing global security 
order. A few case-studies are used as a tool to understand the process of shift in U.S arms trade in 
terms of its trading partners diversifying their options and lastly, evaluating the national defense 
strategy. The thesis reviews national defense strategy, the ineffective policies that led to the erosion 
of global military might and finally concludes whether there is a way back to establish a monopoly 
in the globalized defense industrial complex. 
 
Global Military Advantage 
This study defines global military advantage in terms of how the United States was an 
uncontested power within the international order, exercising its influence, aggression and force 
posture without the presence of competition. It now faces challenges as the changing security 
environment with the rising inter-state competition, and regional powers like China and Russia are 
actively competing with the U.S. In addition to that, the reemergence of revisionist powers poses 
a threat to the existing order of alliances thus, bringing about a shift in alliances.  
It is important to observe the trend of global activities to understand how U.S global 
military superiority is not decreasing in monetary terms; therefore, the sales and profits can reflect 
an increase for the defense industry. But the United States influence, and exercise of power is the 
main determinant for measuring the erosion of its military influence. According to SIPRI 




transfers, and the incidence of armed conflict worldwide has been on the rise.  But more 
specifically the United States has paved its way to strategic nuclear renewal, whereby it is 
enhancing and modernizing nuclear weapons as well as expanding its program of ballistic missile 
defense. Tracking these trends, it can easily be concluded that the U.S global military advantage 
is not subject to erosion however; the erosion is measured in terms of its positioning within the 
international security environment and the extent to which it can influence other states.   
The recent drift into global instability was observed in 2018 by continuing tensions 
between the West and Russia, a US-China trade war was on the rise and the power struggle 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, pitching them on opposite sides of the armed conflicts in Iraq, 
Syria and Yemen.  This thesis revolves around the main concept that US global military lead is 
decreasing in terms of dominance which refers to how various countries opt for trading with other 
key states that are non-U. S allies. Even though the United States yields great profits in terms of 
arms sales nevertheless, it is no longer in the position to use force against countries, such as the 










Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The following section will present an interplay of various theories and existing discourse 
in the context of how they dominate the field of international relations. The broader debate will 
engage the theory of realism, neorealist theory and deterrence theory. The narrowed down 
literature on United States global military advantage will provide two divisions of work, firstly; a 
case for the U.S military power, and secondly an alternative study against the topic. The debate 
against the U.S military power includes the new international order, erosion of the global military 
edge, the case against U.S arms monopoly and the risk factors causing inefficiency within the 
American military industrial complex. The category providing alternative literature includes the 
trends in U.S defense activities and enhancing the U.S military-industrial complex.  
The theory of realism dominated the Cold War period and depicts international affairs as a 
constant struggle of power, with bleak hope to avoid conflict and war. The United States long 
status of a global hegemon being challenged portrays the struggle of power clearly. Classical 
realists such as Morgenthau represent a raw picture of realism, whereby states possess an ‘innate 
desire to dominate others’ like human nature. He further examined the multipolar balance-of-
power system and characterized the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet as 
dangerous. Yet, in today's world despite having various powers competing within the multipolar 
international order is still seen to be dangerous as countries like China, Russia and India are 




In contrast to the theory of realism, Kenneth Waltz neorealist theory is better applicable in 
the interstate competition dominating today's security environment. Waltz explanation of the 
international system identified by various great powers, each seeking for survival draws a clear 
picture of how the American hegemony has been challenged by other powers and therefore, each 
great power is attempting to survive. The United States eroding global military power cannot be 
observed in isolation and therefore, its connection with the former as a global power is necessary 
to make. 5 The United States as the only global power was to quite an extent characterized by its 
uncontested dominance. This type of dominance allowed it to exercise power in whatever way that 
best served its interest. The National Defense Strategy 2018, explicitly outlines, ‘We could 
generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how 
we wanted. Today, every domain is contested - air, land, sea, space and cyberspace’. Not only does 
the Defense Strategy acknowledge the competition it faces but also how it is widespread in every 
domain where power can be utilized. Therefore, Waltz idea of power and survival by great powers 
is evident within policy-making and strategies in today's competitive security environment. 6 
The United States uses the policy of force and hard power to maintain its status-quo in the 
international security environment. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether the use of hard power 
creates deterrence or has the United States observed a pattern of balancing powers by utilizing the 
use of force. Stephen Quackenbush’s work on deterrence theory sees the use of threat by various 
states as a tool to maintain the status quo whereas Frank Zagare regards the deterrence theory as 
 
5 Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, 
no. 4 (1988): 615-28. doi:10.2307/204817. 




an offshoot of the balance of power theory. William Kaufmann also attempts to evaluate that when 
two states exercise equal power, each one of them will be deterred thus, neither will be able to gain 
an advantage on the other state. 7 But, the question of how relevant deterrence is in today's 
international order is still very relevant, considering deterrence might be the problem and not the 
solution. In hope of exercising deterrence as power, military domination for each state has become 
a primary concern therefore, inter-state competition being at rise. 
 
New International Order 
Moving along the years, recent work in the field of international studies has witnessed 
various patterns of change. The changing nature of war, conflict, power, and global security order 
is also presented in Joseph Nye’s work on Changing Nature of World Power. Nye unpacks the 
new international order which is no more dominated by military power rather, economic, 
educational and technological power is seen to play a more dominant role. Robert Keohane also 
agrees with Nye on the crucial role of multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, 
and global financial markets in international politics. 8  
Various contemporary scholars have also stressed upon the dramatic growth of economic 
interdependence in terms of international trade and capital flows serving as a tool for political 
 
7 Kaufmann, William W., "The Requirements of Deterrence"1945 November 15. Henry A. Kissinger Papers, 
Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.   
8  Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age." In 
Governance.com: Democracy in the Information Age, edited by Kamarck Elaine Ciulla and Nye Joseph S., 




cooperation and in addition to that, also a means to expand power. Moreover, widespread literature 
focuses on the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict and on 
the political economy of economic sanctions.’ Jean and Edward in their article on the Political 
Economy of National Security: Economic statecraft, interdependence, and international conflict 
present the interlinkage between international economic and military conflict which is crucial to 
the political economy of national security. Various aspects of this economic-military collaboration 
have been advanced, firstly is that interstate hostilities are inhibited by trade agreements in the 
international market and further also limit the chances of territorial expansion and foreign 
aggression. Trade expansion can benefit the political economy however, in case of increased trade 
barriers the space for economic conflicts can also lead to a political-military disagreement.  9 
The economic-military nexus can also be observed in the United States Defense Strategy. 
Despite desperate efforts being made by the American government to curtail the erosion of its 
global military edge, various countries such as Turkey and Russia are engaging in military trade 
that is hampering the American corporations such as Lockheed Martin and United Technologies. 
Therefore, the political economy of national security and economic sanctions in the case of the 
U.S is an important aspect to explore for understanding how the military might is being damaged. 
Turkey best fits as an example of the interplay between the political economy of national security 
and economic sanctions. Its recent military spending has increased by 24% in 2018 to $19 billion. 
 
9  Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield & Norrin M. Ripsman (1999) The political economy of 
national security: Economic statecraft, interdependence, and international conflict, Security Studies, 9:1-2, 1-




Among the world’s top 15 military spenders, this is observed to be the highest annual percentage 
rise. 10 
Moreover, the political economy of sanctions has played a crucial role between U.S-Turkey 
ties since, Turkey is advancing towards buying Russian S-400 missile defense system. According 
to Washington the S-400 lacks compatibility with NATO systems and therefore, threatens 
Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets - as Turkey could be a potential buyer and partner in production. 
This not only highlights the conflict of interests within the globalized military-industrial complex, 
but also symbolizes the power of international corporations in the security environment. 
Furthermore, Washington has threatened Turkey of potential economic sanctions in case Turkey 
does not back down from the deal. 11 The nexus of economic interests and sanctions shapes the 
United States force posture towards other states in guarding its own interests in order to boost its 
global military dominance. Nonetheless, its force posture and use of hard power in terms of 
sanctions might not be the best strategy to overcome its eroding global military power.  
 
Erosion of Global Military Advantage 
The discourse in the field of international relations has witnessed debates regarding the 
decline of the United States military power. Not only academic and scholarly work reflect the 
 
10 Mehta, Aaron. "Here's How Much Global Military Spending Rose in 2018." Defense News. April 29, 2019. 
https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/04/28/heres-how-much-global-military-spending-rose-in-2018/. 
11 "Turkey Not Distancing Itself from NATO with Russian Missiles Deal:" Reuters. May 03, 2019. Accessed 





decline of the United States military power but also the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the 
United States acknowledges the erosion of their competitive military edge within the international 
order. It identifies how terrorism is no more the main concern rather, inter-state competition has 
implications for its national security. Therefore, the threat to America’s global military advantage 
is important to understand to predict the long-term security environment. The erosion of the 
American military supremacy is witnessed not in the shifting global market share rather, the rise 
of competition it faces from revisionist powers.  
Even though the United States still is the number one military expenditure, other countries 
such as China and Russia are also competing at a fast rate. 12 The following figure reflects how 
Russia and China’s military spending has been increasing over the years. China has been 
continuously increasing its military spending and its spending is ten times more now than it was 
in 1994, therefore, the United States being number one in military spending cannot be viewed in 
isolation. 13 It is important to compare and consider other countries and their trajectory of arms 
sales and military power to determine how the U.S military power is in decline. 
 
 
12 The National Security Strategy - U.S. Department of State." Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 






Figure 1: Russian and Chinese Military Spending 1998-2015 
 
The United States leading global arms trade also allows it to achieve diplomatic and 
security objectives within regions but considering that other countries such as Russia and China 
are also leading within the global market, the former faces drastic change in terms of competition. 
There are various countries where Russia and the U.S both compete for absolute monopoly, and 
the latter is observed to face tough competition. In the case of India, Russia remains the top arms 
supplier whereas the U.S holds second position.  To maneuver the strong hold on India as a trading 
partner, the U.S wants to exercise its diplomatic efforts in restricting Russia’s control within the 
market. Overall, the decline of U.S military power is on its rise, at the same time it is important to 




order where the United States was the only power possessing absolute monopoly and superiority. 
14 
 
The Case Against U.S Arms Monopoly  
 Christopher Coyne in his work on The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly presents how 
the U.S being the dominant player in the global arms market yields various benefits. The monopoly 
allows it to balance global and regional stability as well as safeguard its own national interests and 
domestic economic interests. The arms sales are not only a monetary gain for the U.S, but also acts 
as a geopolitical tool whereby selling weapons to foreign nation states, the U.S establishes ties 
with other regimes and thus, secures its national interests and policy objectives. Coyne expands 
the notion of arms sales into the idea of how the U.S utilizes weapon sales as a payment to 
safeguard strategic commodities such as oil and other assets like military bases. 
United States achieves its interests through multiple means. Coyne refers to military bases 
as one of those means to address its interests and make strategic choices. Utilizing various military 
bases acts as U.S attempts to expand and promote its influence within different regions. The 
complexity of political landscape within different regions compels United States to establish its 
military presence. With U.S military bases established in different regions it enables it to retain its 
forward presence. In East Asia and Europe, it already has military presence however, it further 
expands its presence across Southeast Asia and Middle East as its key economic and political 
 





interests’ surface within the region. The perspectives put forward in the report on U.S. Overseas 
Military Presence by RAND Corporation suggests how the U.S would need to expand its hold in 
Asia to deter Chinese and North Korean military expansion whereas, in the Middle East the same 
formula would be applied against Iran. But despite using the same formula, it can be observed that 
within today’s political environment Syria is another key concern. Meanwhile, in Europe the U.S 
had NATO allies and partners to reassure any potential threats but, with the changing security 
environment NATO members such as Turkey also pose a threat in terms of Russia’s influence over 
key NATO members. Saudi Arabia and India are also key allies in maneuvering for the U.S in 
times of military response, but China’s economic investments and the state of dependency created 
by China will raise security concerns for the U.S influence. 15 
Coyne further identifies the principal-agent problem for the U.S when carrying out arms 
sales to other governments and groups. Though, the U.S attempts in maximizing its power within 
regions and to achieve its foreign policy goals, it overlooks the process of monitoring once 
transferred. Therefore, despite selling weapons to allies it fails to investigate how the weapons can 
be utilized and be transferred to other states that may achieve anti-American interests thus, 
undermining the U.S dominant superiority in the international security environment. An example 
that best reflects the principal-agent problem is U.S supply of over $47 million in arms to Israel 
which ended up in Nahum Manbar, an Israeli businessman involved in providing information and 
supplies for chemical weapons to Iran. 16  
 
15 Lynn E. and Melanie W., “Looming Strategic Choices for U.S. Overseas Military Presence,” RAND 
Corporation, September 11, 2012, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1211.html 
16 Coyne, Christopher J., and Abigail R. Hall. "The Case against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly." SSRN Electronic 




Risk Factors Affecting America’s Industrial Base 
The Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base report presented by Interagency Task 
Force explores the macro forces that are identified as the root causes of the declining industrial 
base. The five risk factors highlighted are sequestration and uncertainty of U.S government 
spending, decline of U.S manufacturing base capabilities and capacity, deleterious U.S 
government business and procurement practices, industrial policies of competitor nations and 
lastly, diminishing U.S STEM and trade skills. The most important aspects are firstly, the U.S 
government spending in terms of uncertainty about future budgets as well as the government 
expenditure which therefore, creates market instability.  
Secondly, the decline of the U.S manufacturing base capabilities and capacity is another 
significant factor contributing to the decline, in terms of hampered production resulting in spiraling 
effect on supply chain.  Therefore, within the globalized defense industrial complex a reduced 
supply by the American industrial base has already led to other competitors capturing potential 
trading partners thus, resulting in the slow-poisoning erosion of U.S military advantage. The gap 
between the globalized rising demand and supply will allow other competitors to sell at a lower 
price. Furthermore, the decline of U.S manufacturing sector which is not only the backbone of U.S 
military technical ability, but also contributes to the economy; 9% of employment, 12% of GDP, 
60% of exports, 55% of patents and 70% of research and development – thus, will damage the 
economic production at a great scale. 17 
 






The third factor which is yet the most important factor is the industrial policies of 
competitor nations, such as China. It is important to mention that almost half of U.S trade deficit 
in goods is with China, which was for $375 billion in 2017.  Many countries have managed to 
target United States industrial base, but China has been the most successful in boosting their 
economy at the expense of America’s manufacturing sector. The role of China’s economic 
expansion is a crucial threat to U.S military power regarding the former adopting military 
modernization as well which is codified in its civil-military fusion. This type of fusion is much 
different from the strategies adopted by the U.S to maintain its power within regions, since along 
military modernization China has developed its infrastructural bases across Eurasia which allows 
it to expand its military might too. Therefore, understanding China’s economic growth is essential 
in comprehending its military modernization since the finance gained from growth is utilized for 
military expansion. It is important to note the U.S trade deficit is in terms of overall goods and not 
limited to defense goods but, despite that the economic deficit impacts the U.S economy at large. 
 China’s economic growth has a directly proportional relationship with its military budget. 
China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 with a gross domestic growing more than 
300%, jumping from $2.4 trillion to $10.2 trillion in 2017 whereas; the U.S real gross domestic 





Figure 2: China's Gross Domestic Growth (post joining WTO) 
 
Comparing economic growth to military budget reflects how both these variables have a positive 
impact on each other. From 2001 till 2007 China’s annual military budget rose from $20 billion to 
$150 billion. According to one of the findings of the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base 
report presented by Interagency Task Force China is progressing and growing the risk it places on 
the supply of materials and technologies which are strategically crucial to the national security of 
the United States. The areas that threaten America’s defense industrial base are specific metals, 
alloys and some magnets. 18 
 







 China’s rapid technological advancement and its trade war with the U.S accompanied by 
its aggressive trade and infrastructural policies like the One Belt, One Road Initiative threaten the 
U.S global military advantage. On the other hand, China is benefited with an exercise of control 
in diplomatic and security objectives; a privilege that the U.S enjoyed within the rules-based 
international order. With the erosion of the global military might and rise of inter-state competition 
U.S can be observed to losing its position in exercising uncontested dominance within the 
international order. 
 
Trends in U.S Global Defense Activities  
U.S defense is characterized by a few dominant trends. Firstly, the U.S defense spending 
is rising, and more revenue generation is expected, yet trends show a decline in the rise itself. The 
defense budget increased by more than 10% in fiscal year 2018 to $590 billion but, in the fiscal 
year 2019 the defense industry observed a rise of only 3% to $606 billion. Therefore, the difference 
in the rise of defense budget and the pace it grows at depends on multiple factors such as, which 
segment of the market is targeted for growth and what strategic decisions are taken by companies. 
Overall, the long-term growth possibility is uncertain due to political issues. These political issues 
range from India and Turkey’s strengthening trade ties with Russia, China’s economic investments 
in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. But at the same time, Saudi regimes ties with the U.S is of a 
great deal in terms of arms trade and in support for U.S against Iran. Despite, increasing threats 
from rivals like Russia and China which push the U.S for a stronger military there has been growth 




Secondly, the U.S still wants to specialize in advanced technology at an economical cost 
despite overall increased defense spending. Many contractors have also been demanding suppliers 
to reduce costs therefore, most companies have worked towards their cost structures with an aim 
of being more competitive, but even then, most of these savings trickle down to customers limiting 
material advancement in profits. Thirdly, another trend observed is that companies within the 
defense sector have increased mergers and acquisitions activity and this is seen to rise in the 
coming years. An example of mergers is Harris Corp. and L3 Technologies Inc., meanwhile, other 
large prime contractors such as Boeing, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin continue to acquire 
smaller companies to expand new technologies. The defense industry remains competitive and 
though the competition can be productive, it also causes inefficiency at a national scale. The 
section on competition and centralization which generates inefficiency of the U.S arms industry 
causing the erosion of the global military advantage will be further unpacked in detail.  
Lastly, an overall decline in global economy is observed and even though the U.S defense 
industry is not affected by short-term economic conditions, an international slowing down of 
economic activity and the demand from other states can have a negative impact on the U.S arms 
trade.  19 
 





Sustaining and Enhancing the U.S Military’s Technological Edge  
Flournoy and Robert’s work on how US can sustain and enhance its military’s 
technological superiority provides an alternate approach to the research topic. 20The argument 
presented in this thesis is most relevant to Flournoy and Robert’s work which provides both sides 
of the topic. The factors influencing erosion, and how the military power can be preserved, restored 
and enhanced. Nonetheless, the gap within the literature remains which is addressed in this thesis; 
whether there is a way back to the erosion of the United States global military edge?  
It regards how the successful process of sustaining and enhancing its military technological 
effect will contribute to the restoration of the global military might. The author expands how the 
United States has been superior in terms of its military and technological advantage over its 
competitors for decades. Its technological skill set and the Department of Defense role’s efficiency 
in developing and integrating new, cutting-edge capabilities which include C4SIR, network 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance has 
been a crucial mode of strength.  
Despite all the positives, the paper further moves on to unfold the new challenges.  The 
United States can no longer completely rely on its military and technological power. There are 
various reasons and challenges that have changed the status-quo of America’s military industrial 
complex. Firstly, competitors like China and Russia are heavily investing in their military and 
technological base in order to compete directly with the U.S military might. China is not only 
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specializing in military strength but also broadening its economic power through its Belt and Road 
initiative (BRI) development project.  
The effort to sustain and enhance the US military and technological might is already in the 
process. The U.S has explicitly outlined in its National Defense Strategy that it needs to counter 
the inter-state competition which is now its primary concern compared to terrorism that defined 
the last decade in terms of U.S national security interest. The steps taken now to sustain its existing 
military edge and further enhance it will affect the future international order. Flournoy and Robert 
provide ten actions that can be strategized to protect US military superiority.  
Firstly, to create a sense of urgency within the DOD. This strategy focuses on the 
departments clear vision and urgent action on sustaining US military might. In order to promote 
the protection and enhancement the strategy recommends defense leaders create a ‘team of teams’ 
approach which is somewhat like the Joint Special Operations Task Force mode. This approach 
can be utilized to set a shared goal for innovation and translating the decentralized decision-
making. Secondly, to build the momentum of already existing DOD efforts. This would allow 
implementing a third “offset strategy”. This would focus on preserving the US military might in 
terms of global power projection. The momentum on this strategy should be maintained and 
pursued continuously. Thirdly, to create a healthy competition which works on the challenges the 
U.S would face in the coming decades. This being a very crucial factor, further expanded in this 
thesis regarding the damaging effects of reduced competition within the United States defense 
industry. 
Another strategy is to ‘eliminate the barriers between those who define requirements, those 




be coordination and communication between different communities representing the same agenda. 
Moreover, the problem of competition between the US military industrial complex needs to be 
addressed by ‘creating a safe space for deeper dialogue and engagement with industry, both 
traditional defense industry and commercial companies.’ This would allow collaborative brain-
storming and innovation possible. Currently, it is difficult for DOD officials to have a healthy 
dialogue with leaders from within the industry about various problems being faced by the U.S 
military and explore any possible solutions. The increase of investment in activities that drive 
innovation would also serve as a tool to protect the US military superiority.  
Moreover, the author identifies enhancement of ‘DOD’s ability to work with the most 
innovative companies in the commercial tech sector’ as a strategy that can yield positive outcomes. 
The increase in more rapid and flexible acquisition authorities to accelerate acquisition is vital but 
even then, requires government plans and more incentives. Empowering professionals throughout 
the stages of the process and further, strengthen accountability for performance in acquisition is 
yet another booster for sustaining the defense capabilities. This will lead to the improvement of 
DOD’s ability to provide war-fighting capabilities. Lastly, to support and accelerate congressional 
effort in order to reform the acquisition system.   
The U.S cannot succeed in sustaining and enhancing military and technological strength 
unless a healthier and balanced defense budget is created that allows expanded innovation and 
acquisition. To protect the national security interest of the United States it is crucial to uphold and 










Chapter 3: Methodology  
 This paper will qualitatively examine a set of documents and data available for addressing 
the research question. It will draw much of its findings through document analysis from U.S 
government websites such as the U.S Department of Defense. Furthermore, the documents would 
include public military power publications, national defense strategies, annual reports and 
publications. This thesis will also explore the economics of the U.S defense industry in terms of 
various important companies such as Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin. It will categorize 
how profit-seeking corporations have a great contribution in the defense industrial complex as well 
as the erosion of dominance over the years. Lastly, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute database will be used to measure top importers and exporters of arms trade as well as to 
observe changes in the patterns of trade. 
Considering the information available as well as data limitations, this thesis relies heavily 
on document analysis that are available in open sources. This thesis clearly illustrates the erosion 
of U.S military dominance and how it has evolved as a process over the decades. It aims to use 
relevant findings from government documents, multiple corporations’ annual reports and SIPRI’s 
databases to explore whether the U.S can regain its uncontested military dominance. 
Limitations 
Research on the defense industry of the United States of America is often faced by data 
constraints. Various limitations are due to the sensitivity of national security and thus, researchers 




regarding arms supply, trade and deals lacks transparency and accountability. Therefore, this 
research is also faced by similar challenges. 
The nature of this research requires careful observation and data analysis of information 
related to military and national security. It is prone to various limitations which defines this study. 
Firstly, the existing literature indicates that research on this topic does not provide hidden vested-
interests and costs of various arms sales. These vested-interests refer to loopholes that are not 
addressed in open source data. For e.g. why the United States sells weapons to undemocratic 
regimes such as, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, a major aspect of U.S military dominance cannot be 
explored.  
Secondly, this research is also restricted based on a given time-frame. It lasts roughly six 
months to a year therefore; this research is outlined in multiple phases. It introduces the 
globalization of the defense industrial complex, and further addresses the changing strategic 
security environment at the international scale; the reemergence of revisionist powers threatening 
the existing international order. Moreover, it explores various shifts in the U.S arms trade, analyzes 
the U.S defense industry’s capabilities and evaluates the U.S national defense strategy before 
presenting the findings to determine if there is a process to regain the military power and if so, 
what strategies can be utilized. 
Lastly field work is not explored as an option within this research. The United States 
military dominance and its process of erosion is a sensitive topic and is of national interest. 
Therefore, experts within the field refrain from providing information which isn’t already available 




Chapter 4: Case-studies 
 
The following section explores whether United States global military edge is eroding or 
not. Two main case-studies analyzed within this section are China and Russia. A detailed 
examination of these case-studies is carried out to investigate defense policies, trends of their 
military sales and the impact it has on shifting allegiances in the international order leading to the 
erosion of U.S military presence. These case-studies define whether the erosion of American 
global military presence is a permanent phenomenon or not. This research will further determine 
whether there is a way back or not; and if there is a way back what are the strategies that can be 
adopted to restore or sustain the U.S military power and presence within the international order.  
Despite enjoying decades of powerful military influence with added technological 
advantage, the U.S now does face competition by its adversaries. United States is no longer the 
superpower that could exercise its military strength almost in every domain. It faces pressure from 
powers like China and Russia, both heavily investing in their military industrial base with an aim 
of countering U.S military power and, addressing U.S vulnerabilities within different regions.22 
 Each of the case-study within this section will target the countries positioning to be a 
competitive threat to the United States. The first case-study is China which explores military sales 
and presence of China in Asia, Middle East and Africa. It will cover firstly, the defense strategy 
of China over the past decade before moving on to the analysis of its decade long strategy shift. 
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Secondly, it will unpack China’s economic expansion and its Belt Road initiative to be a tool of 
undercover military expansion. 
The second case-study is of Russia which unpacks a brief introduction of Russia’s defense 
industry in terms of how it competes within the global market with the United States. It addresses 
the comparison between both competitors in terms of what the Russian arms offer that the U.S 
arms don’t.  It further examines its military presence in Eurasia, specifically in Turkey and India. 
The former being a NATO member and a not so accepted ally of the United States anymore. In 
contrast to Turkey, India being a key ally of the U.S. Both cases investigate Russian military 
advancement within the latter’s defense market. 
A. China 
China’s process and growth over the years has seen various shifts and trends in terms of its 
economic and defense policy. China was the second biggest spender in 2018, account falling 
within the 60% of global military spending.23 It can be classified into three phases beginning from 
2010 till 2019. The three phases that are examined within this research range from 2008-2010, 
2010-2014 and 2014-2019.  
These time ranges broadly explore China’s overall growth, and specifically study its 
defense strategy. Each phase investigates the defense policy changes and China’s fundamental 
security interests in terms of the changing security environment within the international order. 
Each phase is identified by a certain trend. China’s 2010 defense policy is characterized by 
 




strategic economic opportunities however, an overall favorable security environment. Following 
2014’s defense policy, dominated by unprecedented challenges while being at a critical stage of 
reform and development. A key trend to observe was China’s goal to be able to carry out a counter-
nuclear attack. Both phases witnessed a balanced defense policy with an aim to strengthen China’s 
defense base and resist aggression but specifically, the defense policy of 2019 identifies a ‘New 
Era’ whereby the international military is undergoing historic changes. It characterizes US as a 
provoking agent to rising competition and incorporates the changing nature of war whereby, the 
development of technology in the military field is seen as a must. 
 
China’s Defense Policy 2010  
China’s defense policy in 2010 was a period characterized by strategic economic 
opportunities, and an overall favorable security environment. It was successful to counter its 
financial crisis and maintained a balanced economic growth. At a regional scale it was reinforcing 
cordial relations with neighboring countries. Its defense strategy remained defensive in nature. It 
focused on China’s modernization through building and laying the foundations of a strong national 
defense and armed forces. Despite having a defense strategy that was defensive in nature, it was 
determined by a development path. Its fundamental aim was to defend national security interest 
in terms of resisting aggression and protecting China’s lands, inland waters, territorial waters, 
airspace, maritime rights and cyberspace.  
China’s security challenges are complex in nature due to its vast territories and territorial 




the 2010 National Defense Policy identifies Taiwan’s independence as its biggest obstacle.  The 
separatist forces and their activities were perceived as a threat to China in terms of its cross-Strait 
relations. Even though progress regarding adhering 1992 consensus (recognizing One China) 
enhanced mutual trust and bilateral terms, it still regards Taiwan as a threat to its defense.  
China’s Defense Policy of 2010 not only recognized Taiwan as a threat rather, explicitly 
identifies the United States heavily hampering Sino-US relations by selling weapons to Taiwan. 
It perceives that the United States is damaging the peaceful security environment of cross-Strait 
relations. 24 
 
China’s Defense Policy 2014 
 China’s defense policy in 2014 labeled the world facing unprecedented challenges. It 
recognized China being at a critical stage of reform and development. Very different from the 
defense policy of 2010, the Chinese dream was highlighted as pursuing a peaceful development 
path whereby, a stable security environment would provide China with greater opportunities. 
However, along the era of reform and development China aimed to stick to its independent foreign 
policy, and a defense policy that is defensive in nature in order to pave its way in opposing 
hegemony and power politics. The 2014 policy outlines China’s unwillingness to seek expansion. 
 China’s military strategy was to adapt with the changing security environment by strongly 
adhering to the goal of the Communist Party of China to build a solid military that can counter 
 





every new situation. It focused on modernizing of national defense and its armed forces in order 
to safeguard China’s sovereignty, national security and economic development interests. China’s 
2014 defense policy associates the global order being multi-polar and economic globalization 
accelerating to Asia-Pacific regions, whereas the US is on its effort to rebalance the security 
environment in the region. China’s territorial and maritime interests are of key concern and thus, 
considering these factors China plans to build a stronger and more secure defense strategy. 
The 2014 defense policy unpacks various strategic tasks, out of which the most thought-
provoking is to deal with military threats and be able to carry out a counter-nuclear attack.  Despite 
from what the defense policy enunciates, it is not guaranteed whether China would use its nuclear 
power for countering purpose only. The trend of adapting to new security challenges is a sign to 
predict that China can change its defense policy from defensive posture to a force posture.  
   The changing circumstances and conditions need to be predicted, in order to assess when 
and how China would switch its posture from defensive to an aggressive one. These shifting 
conditions and adaptation to new security challenges also include that, ‘The PLA Navy will 
enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint 
operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support’ which is now evident in 
its logistic base in Djibouti. 25 The case of Djibouti and how Chinese defense strategy has 
expanded beyond borders will be further analyzed within this research. 
 






China’s Defense Policy 2019 – In the New Era 
  China’s defense policy of 2019 recognizes it has entered a new era and acknowledges the 
fact that the international military competition is undergoing historic changes. While it points out 
various uncertainties in the international security environment and the realignment of international 
powers, it also accepts the strategic competition is on the rise. With the acceptance of this 
competition China prepares itself to be one of the main competitors.  
The 2019 defense policy highlights how the U.S has adjusted its defense strategies and has 
also, ‘provoked’ intensification of competitor. Moreover, China has managed to increase its 
defense budget which now also adds on the capacity to incorporate outer space and cyber defense. 
2019 Defense policy sheds light on the changing nature of war to intelligence warfare. 
Furthermore, it recognizes NATO’s expansion of its military development in Central and Eastern 
Europe while, Russia’s strengthening of its nuclear and non-nuclear base with the aim of strategic 
containment. The policy focuses on how the military field is now being dominated by a 
technological revolution whereby, the use of cutting-edge technologies, cloud computing, 
quantum information, big data and artificial intelligence is becoming more mainstream. 26 
 While China’s distinctive feature of its national defense policy calls attention to its goal of 
never seeking hegemony or expanding its sphere of influence its economic development and 
investment reflects a different trend. China’s overseas direct investment has been on the rise thus, 
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showing its progressive trend towards economic expansion. Figure 3 helps to explain China’s 
economic expansionist agenda: 27 
 
Figure 3: Stock of China’s Outbound Direct Investment (ODI) 2010-2014 
 
The 2019 defense policy also outlines strategic tasks which are very different from its 
previous 2014 defense policy. The fundamental goal is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security 
and its development interests. Nevertheless, the most highlighted tasks that can lead to countering 
the U.S indirectly are ‘opposing and containing Taiwan independence, crack down on proponents 
 






of separatist movements such as Tibet independence and the creation of East Turkestan’ and lastly, 
to ‘safeguard China’s security interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace’. 
 
Analysis of China’s Defense Policy 
Defense Posture 
 The defense policies of China have observed a shift since 2010. From a focus on strategic 
economic opportunities and maintaining a favorable security environment, it drifted towards a 
stage of reform and development, recognizing unprecedented challenges within the global security 
environment. Quite opposite from the past trends, more recently its policy has observed a greater 
change whereby, it now recognizes it has stepped into a ‘New Era’. Both the defense policy of 
2010 and 2014, sheds light on China’s unwillingness to expand its influence. In contrary to that, 
in 2019 the defense policy has accepted that the military field is going through ‘historic changes.’ 
In the light of these changes it is likely that China brings about more shifts in their defense policy 
whereby, its economic expansion and military goals will change.  
This analysis incorporates China’s future defense posture, including its economic 
expansion which provides it with an edge on other countries, and expands onto how the posture 
will affect and hamper U.S military advantage within the global order. According to its defense 
policy the two main strategic tasks that China intends to focus on the most and regards it as a major 




The Belt Road Initiative –An Undercover Economic-Military Project 
This section will cover China’s Belt Road Initiative and the economic investments done 
under the umbrella of BRI, to draw a direct connection between BRI investment and military 
partnership. It investigates countries that are the beneficiaries of both economic and military 
expansion.  China is making efforts to further expand its presence within different regions. It has 
various economic projects in the Middle-East, Asia and Africa. In Middle East it has Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, U.A.E, Egypt and Israel to strengthen ties with. In Africa it has Djibouti, a key concern 
for the United States.  
In Asia, it mainly has Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar to explore with its 
expansionist tendencies. These tendencies include economic and military investments therefore, 
China’s Belt Road Initiative is directly linked to its military expansion too. Figure 4 reflects 
China’s global development strategy intertwined with arms sales in Asia. Since 2007 onwards, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar have received China’s top arms; all three countries are 
beneficiaries of the Belt and Road Initiative too. According to SIPRI calculations in 2018, 
Bangladesh received 75 million units of arms whereas, Myanmar received 105 million units and 
Pakistan 448 units. 28  
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Figure 4: Arms Exported from China 2007-2018 
 
China is also seen to have a well-established presence in MENA countries, especially in 
terms of investment.  Figure 5 shows investment of $20 billion in various projects and firms by 
the Chinese government since 2005. The Belt Road initiative within the graph also represents the 
investment taken place. 29 China’s Belt Road Initiative launched in 2013, which is also termed as 
the One Belt, One Road; it has an aim to strengthen China’s economic presence and activity 
throughout the world. It not only covers vast amount of geographical area, but also includes 
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infrastructural plans for various regions. It extended to 65 countries with combined GDP of $23 
trillion, partnering with 4.4 billion people.  
 
 
Figure 5: Chinese Investment in MENA Countries; MENA countries with more than $ 20 billion worth of investment 





Figure 6: Belt Road Initiative Global Investment 
 
According to the Asian Development Bank, it is noted that developing countries require 
$26 trillion in infrastructure investment for the sustainability of BRI. Despite facing various 
challenges, the BRI can profit heavily in terms of economic and political gains. It will lead to the 
expansion of Chinese export markets, further promote the Renminbi as an international currency, 




and economic ties between China and other regions, it is justified to say that the entire economic 
cycle will be dominated by China, allowing it to further shape the international order. 30  
With the Belt Road Initiative and economic investments, it is evident that China is also 
becoming a top arms dealer. It has managed to be in competition at par with U.S, Russia, Germany 
and France. A very important link of military expansion and the BRI is that top customers of arms 
include the BRI partners. According to SIPRI China has managed to export 16.2 billion units of 
ammunition in the past twelve years. Mostly the receivers are countries in Asia, Middle East and 
Africa, the same regions where the BRI is active. 31 
 
China’s Regional Military Expansion  
1. Asia 
Years of economic growth with the added advantage of military modernization has enabled 
China to become a key player in the global arms trade. Between 2008 and 2017, China has been 
observed to export $14.4 billion worth of conventional weapons throughout the world. This made 
China the 5th largest arms supplier in the world after the United States, Russia, France and 
Germany. SIPRI’s data shows China’s conventional arms sales increased from $650 million in 
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2008 to $1.13 billion in 2017.32 It is also important to note, 74% of these went to Asia. Despite 
these figures, the overall defense trade of China is pale in comparison to the United States. The 
United States exports averaged $9 billion annually over the last ten years.  
China mostly exports arms to neighboring countries. During mid-1990s and mid-2000s 
82.8% exports was across Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar received 62.4% of China’s 
conventional weapons since 2008. Other Asian countries comprise of 11.8% of Chinese arms. 
China’s arms sales have seen shifts as they rose from $386 million in 2008 to $1.5 billion in 2016, 
followed by a decrease to $948 million in 2017. Economic ties to Pakistan have made way for 
military ties too for China. These exchanges are often based on political objectives. Growing 
cooperation amongst the two countries on counter-terrorism led to a surge in sales from $250 
million in 2008 to over $750 million in 2009. The sale of a sophisticated optical tracking system 
that could be used for nuclear missiles was also given out in 2018. This sale was carried out right 
after India tested its Agni-V long-range ballistic missile. Other purchases also included JF-17 
thunder aircraft which has been greatly appreciated by the Pakistan public and showcased on 
Pakistan’s military parade.  The following figure reflects Chinese arms sales across Asia through 
2008-2017.33 Table 1 exhibits a breakdown of the sales made to various countries in Asia. 
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The case of Pakistan-China military sales symbolizes how a shift in U.S policy has resulted 
in a decline in their arms trade, and therefore given way to China to take away United States market 
share. These developments were first seen during U.S sanctions on Pakistan in 1965 which led to 
a rise in Chinese-Pakistan military sales. By early 1980s, 75% of tanks and 65% of Pakistan 
Pakistan              $ 6,074 million 
Bangladesh         $ 2,106 million 
Myanmar         $ 1,275 million 
Iran                      $   367 million  
Indonesia          $   313 million 
Rest of Asia       $ 1,360 million  




Airforce aircrafts were given by the Chinese. China also had a key role in Pakistan’s nuclear 
program in terms of the technology transfer. Another phase of U.S policy allowing Chinese 
defense industry to overtake a segment of the U.S defense industry market share, was from 2009-
2018 due to Trump administrations force posture. This resulted in withdrawing of U.S aid in 2018. 
Therefore, again allowing the rise of Chinese arms exports in Pakistan as a result of change in U.S 
foreign policy.  
The following table 2 and table 3 represents the share of Chinese exports to Pakistan in the 
total arms sales through 2009-2018. Despite Pakistan being the largest arms market for China, the 
steady decline reflects China’s aim to diversify its arms market. China’s aim to diversify in the 
global defense industry is based on its expansionist path to compete with the ‘United States for the 
global superpower spot’ 34 
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Table 2: Share of China and USA in arms exports to Pakistan (%) 2009-2018 
 
 






2. Middle East  
Middle East is yet another region observed to attract Chinese investments at quite a fast pace. 
It is firstly important to understand why the Middle East is such a hot cake for the global powers. 
The main source is the region’s energy resources which fuel and shape economic and defense 
policies of various countries. This is reflective in the estimates too, 79.4% of the world’s oil reserve 
is concentrated in OPEC member countries, out of which Middle East amounts for 64.5% of the 
total.35  The following figure represents a break-down of the energy reserves: 
 
 
Figure 8: OPEC share of world crude oil reserves, 2018 
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According to the International Energy Agency it is predicted that by 2030, China’s import 
of oil will rise to at least 10 million barrels a day, the current import level of the United States.36 
Therefore, the Middle East is a perfect place for China to both take its energy supply from and 
further penetrate deeper in the arms sales. Currently, China’s aim is to purchase stakes in the region 
through economic means. It is seen to launch development projects and improve its ties with Iran 
and Saudi Arabia.  
In addition to the energy resources, China is experiencing gains from the Middle East 
exports. It has managed to organize itself as a key export destination therefore, diversifying its 
economic options as well as paving way to shadow countries with its presence. Figure 9 shows 
China’s entry in Middle Eastern economic markets as top five export destination. An important 
pattern seen here is that Israel, an American ally has also carried out exports to China worth $ 4.6 
billion in 2018. Despite the U.S being the top destination, China is also a fast-growing trade partner 
for Israel. 37 
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Figure 9: Exports to China from MENA Countries; China has emerged as a vital export destination for several 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa. For these countries above, China made the top five in 2018 38 
 
China is observed to be developing its ties with individual countries rather than the entire 
region. As Chinese economy expands, the country’s demand for energy also increases. Therefore, 
China sees the Middle East as an important region to explore. It has five principal partners in the 
region; Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Israel. This paper closely examines 
China’s Middle East model, in terms it’s grand strategy for the region for Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
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This grand strategy includes narrowed down focused objectives with each of the individual 
countries in the region. 39 
 
a) Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is China’s largest trading partner in West Asia. Furthermore, various Chinese 
construction firms are assisting Saudi Arabia in building infrastructure. On the other hand, Saudi 
Arabia is also interested in building tailor made refineries and petrochemical production facilities 
within China. It seems that Saudi Arabia is using China as a tap on western oil consumption as 
well as western influence in Saudi Arabia. 40 41 
While there is economic cooperation amongst the two countries, there is also military trade 
and partnership. While $65 billion have been agreed to invest in joint ventures, the sale of 
intermediate range (3000 km) ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia by China are also seen to be a part 
of ‘China card’.42 China’s military relations with Saudi Arabia have been developing more 
significantly. One of these interests is reflected in Saudi Arabia’s Air Force utilizing Chinese 
UAVs. Together, their militaries are also holding counter-terrorism exercises in Western China; it 
is important to note these are exercises the former would conduct with the U.S military previously. 
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Recently, the Saudi port of Jeddah was paid a visit by the Chinese navy vessels, a step towards 
impacting conditions in the Gulf of Aden, a vital water route especially for Persian Gulf oil. 43 
China’s arms exports have been on the increase since 2018. That is a trend seen since the 
past 15 years, allowing China to become one of the largest arms suppliers. Out of more than $25 
billion worth of arms sales, $10 billion of it comprises of military equipment to the Middle East 
with Saudi Arabia accounting for it too along with other countries such as U.A.E and Iraq. 
Moreover, China’s market for armed UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicle) has been on the growth, 
Saudi Arabia is a receiver of CAIHONG, a series of its UAVs. 44 
Furthermore, satellite images first presented by Jane’s Defense Weekly in mid-2013, 
analyzed by Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, suggest that Saudi Arabia 
had made its ballistic missile factory which brings the Kingdoms nuclear ambitions in the 
limelight. Despite being a U.S ally the factory at a missile base in al-Watah is under suspicion 
based on China providing the ballistic missiles. According to the institute’s analyst, the Saudi 
engine test stand was like a Chinese one. The result after the analysis of the satellite imagery were 
that, ‘China partially covers the flame shooting out of the engine and cools the test building with 
water, so it does not catch fire. The Saudi test complex appears to replicate that setup…’  
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Moreover, another factor that raises the question of United States military advantage being 
challenged not only by China, but also its own allies. Despite Saudi Arabia’s request being turned 
down by the U.S for purchasing category-one American drones, which included the Predator and 
Reapers due to Missile Technology Control Regime regulations; the former approached China to 
purchase drones followed by a deal of a drone factory build in Saudi Arabia by the Chinese. 45  
This factory would produce a replica of the Predator. These efforts are reflective of Saudi Arabia’s 
inclination towards a military buildup that too, more diversified and in partnership with other 
countries other than its closest ally, the United States. It is a way forward towards military 
partnership with other regional powers, therefore Saudi Arabia is an example of how the U.S allies 
opt for alternatives for military might and explore the options that are direct competitors of the 
United States military industrial complex.  
b) Iran 
China has arrived in the Middle East and is observed to be making efforts in establishing 
its economic presence within the region. It has the power to shape regional markets which comes 
with the cost of regional security arrangement.  The main concern within the region is Iran, a 
trading partner of China within the global defense industry.46 A benefit for China and a negative 
for the region itself that China now possesses the power to rearrange security environment within 
the Middle East. 
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The Chinese-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership 2016 represents a shift in the 
international order and balance of power. The fundamental pillar of the deal was the investment of 
$280bn in developing Iran’s oil, gas and petrochemical sector. Moreover, it classified another $120 
billion investment in Iran’s infrastructure. This heavily invested economic interests in Iran require 
security and protection in the light of current U.S sanctions on Iran. China is a regional power and 
would not risk to invest in a country without any incentives therefore, the Chinese have included 
5,000 Chinese security personnel within Iran to safeguard Chinese investments. The deployment 
of these security personnel has been pictured in protecting economic interests, but in fact are a 
symbolization of the economic-military expansion China is carrying out specific and unique in 
every region. 
 Additional personnel are expected to be deployed with added material available for the 
smooth transition of oil, gas and petrochemicals from Iran to China. China believes the 
development of Iran’s infrastructure is in line with its Belt Road Initiative. This will allow China 
to exploit cheap Iranian labor as well. The infrastructural development also includes a 2300 km 
New Silk Road which provides China with access to Iran from Urumqi, which further extends to 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and finally via Turkey into Europe.47  
This economic and infrastructural investment is seen to come along with military presence, 
characterized as ‘security personnel’ to protect the economic interests of Chinese investments. 
Furthermore, China is seen to expand its inter-regional economic and military influence whereby 
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not only it allows itself for troops to be deployed but, also Chinese companies and projects. China 
admits these projects are a part of the Belt Road Initiative. The BRI is observed to be more than 
just an economic initiative. Rather it reflects to act as an infrastructural tool to economic 
colonization with an added slow-paced military presence.  
 Iran’s military relationship with China can be dated back to the mid 1980’s when China 
sold Iran anti-ship cruise missiles in different phases. These missiles included the Silkworm (HY-
2), the C-801 and C-802. It seems China’s intentions have further expanded now. China is also 
observed to sell surface-to-surface cruise missiles as well as assisting the country in long-range 
ballistic missiles. 48 In 2003 the CIA issued a report on China’s record of proliferation activities 
which highlighted that China along with Russia and North Korea were helping Iran’s in their 
ballistic missile program. 49 Beijing has also played a part of Iran’s nuclear and chemical weapons 
programs despite assuring Washington that it was not in the process of doing so. An example of 
this was its supply of uranium conversion facility and nuclear power reactors to Iran. 50 
 
3. Africa – Djibouti 
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August 1, 2017 marks the day when China’s People Liberation Army established its 
military presence in Djibouti, Africa. It managed to build its first military base located near the 
Chinese Port of Doraleh. It is not quite far from the U.S Naval base, Camp Lemonnier. Despite, 
China expressing its lack of interest in expansionist tendencies it has paved its departure smoothly 
from not stationing troops in foreign countries to having a well-based military base in Djibouti. 
China’s Ministry of National Defense officially confirmed its agreement with Djibouti. It 
regards the base as a ‘logistical support facilities’ that would be crucial in guarding its country’s 
overseas national interests. This ‘support base’ is a preliminary example of China’s economic 
interests translating into infrastructural and logistical capacities resulting in its own power-
projection capabilities throughout the world.  51 The National Bureau of Asian Research’s report 
on Securing the Belt and Road Initiative rightfully outlines how Chinese naval base in Djibouti is 
a way forward for the country to build more bases in other regions with the changing global 
security environment.  
Chinese base in Djibouti is more than just a military presence in Africa, it is a shift of 
policy in terms of China’s military stance and strategic identity. China’s foreign policy in the past 
was characterized by the absence of Chinese military presence, however the case is not the same 
anymore. Chinese Foreign Ministry has clarified the building of bases in the near future with the 
aim of protecting overseas Chinese interests. It is important to note that China’s military might 
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makes its way along its economic and infrastructural investments thus, creating a strong hold and 
base within different regions to penetrate with its military power. 
How important is the naval base in Djibouti for China? The Ministry of National Defense 
has outlined three purposes the base serves. Firstly, it will be used for deployment of troops. 
Secondly, it will in return provide logistical assistance to patrols, and lastly aid ‘humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.’ The future of the base is an important aspect to 
be observed. Various dimensions need to be investigated to conclude whether Chinese could use 
the base against its enemies. The type of operations conducted in order to protect Chinese interests 
is a key concern for the security of the region. 52  
Djibouti is a small piece of land but holds key strategic location. It provides a shipping 
route between Asia and the Suez Canal. The economic use of the base which in turn amplifies 
military presence by various countries is based on an estimated 4.8 million barrels of oil is exported 
from the Bab el-Mandab a strait adjacent to the base. Djibouti is also geographically close to 
Yemen which is again a very important location for the United States as it exercises its power 
against Houthi militants from Yemen. 53 
Over all, the successful attempt of military presence in Africa is a symbolization of 
broadened Chinese national interests and challenges. As analyzed in the section above on China’s 
2014 military strategy, the base in Djibouti is a real-life example and reflection of China’s 
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defensive posture transitioning into an aggressive one. Its 2014 military strategy specifically 
outlined, ‘adapting to new security challenges’ thus, edging it way into establishing strong military 






Russia is the world’s second largest exporter of arms, right after the U.S. It has managed 
to maintain and strengthen its position within the defense industry. It holds immense importance 
within the global defense industry as it occupies the second position within the market, enabling it 
to be a competitor of the United States defense industrial complex. 54 SIPRI’s top list for trend-
indicator value of global arms exports for the year 2018 shows the second rank of Russia as a 
global arms exports in table 4. 55 
 
Table 4: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; Russia's second rank as a supplier in global arms exports for 2018 
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Countries that do not share a very warm relation with the U.S in terms of arms trade 
approach Russia, being a U.S competitor in the market. Various countries are served by the Russian 
defense industry. Asia has positioned itself as a monopoly within the Russian defense market, as 
it accounted for 70% of their exports back in 2000. Arms trade has a crucial place in Russian 
economy as it contributes a large proportion of manufactured exports. Therefore, one of the main 
industries in Russia, is the arms industry which is also one of the main markets in the global 
defense industry. It serves as a key source for employment generation and profit yielding.  
21% of global arms sales in 2016 were carried out by Russia, and this is not a new 
phenomenon. Despite short-term fluctuations, Russia has maintained a competitor of the United 
States and most likely will remain so in the coming future. Various phases witness shifting trends 
for Russia, but it is important to note there are phases such as in 2013, Russian arms exports value 
bypassed United States exports. Figure 11 below represents the share of total global arms exports 
through the period of 2000-2016; highlighting that Russia accounts fall for an annual average of 





Figure 10: Share of Total Global Arms Exports 2000-2016 
 
Considering the share of Russian exports, it is important to break-down the broad 
categories of weapon systems which lacks uniformity. The country’s global exports can be 
separated into five main fields; air-defense systems, missiles, aircrafts, sensors and artillery 
systems. Out of these five, the first three are the strength and the cornerstone of the Russia defense 
industry. The following graphical data reflects the strength of Russia defense industry in air-
defense systems, missiles and aircraft occupying 41.1%, 25.6% and 24.7% of global sales in the 
period of 2010-2016. It is also evident that Russia has managed to work on other product categories 
thus, showing improvement in shares from 2010-2016 as compared to 2000-2009. 56 
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Figure 11: Russia’s share of global exports in selected categories of weapon systems, 2000–09 and 2010–16 (% of 
total global arms exports) 
 
Moving on to the past decade, Russia’s weapons sales has also witnessed fluctuations in 
terms of rising sales. In 2017 Russia’s weapons sales were $ 5741 million rising to $ 6409 million 
in 2018. These fluctuations are represented in figure 13; 2011 observed an all-time high in weapons 
sales to $8690 million. 57 I 2017, out of $15 billion of weapons sales, $6.14 billion were of major 
weaponry which comprised of military aircraft, ships, armored vehicles and guided munitions. If 
these figures are further narrowed down, the monopoly of military aircraft sales in Russian defense 
is evident. Out of the $6.14 billion nearly $4 billion were directed towards exports of military 
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aircraft. The recipients of these weaponry from Russia in 2017 include Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Angola, Vietnam, Algeria, China, Egypt and India. 58  
Out of these top ten countries, this research will focus on India as a case-study falling under 
the Russian influence in terms of defense trade. India is an important U.S ally and a defense trading 
partner. The second case-study is of Turkey which will also be examined in terms of its recent 
unstable relation with the United States and developing military partnership with Russia. Both case 
studies will determine how and to what extent Russian penetration in their respective defense 
markets is taking place.   
Currently, Russian exports for the year of 2019 have reached a total of almost $6 billion 
by now. The Russian defense industry is in the phases of examining global trends and adapting to 
new areas of work within the market. These include challenges such as economic restriction and 
various financial operations for foreign trade. These economic restrictions define and limit the 
scope of trade for Russia with other foreign countries that are under obligation to adhere to rules 
applied by financial institutions. This in result hampers the Russian arms selling with other players 
in the global market. U.S efforts symbolize how economic policies are used in order to compete 
with the Russian defense industry, in terms of creating trade barriers that allow the United States 
to remain the number one within the global defense industrial complex. A key example of these 
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economic restrictions affecting Russian defense industry was Turkey’s successful move to 

















Turkey’s defense industry has observed transformation over the last two decades. This 
transformation is characterized by military modernization. Based on a stable political leadership 
under Erdogan’s support for defense expenditure and various operations. Based on open-source 
investigation, Turkey possessed a total defense spending of $12.98 billion in 2018, attaining 18th 
rank globally within the NATO alliance.  
The strategic plan of Turkey from 2012-2016 was formulated to boost the involvement of 
Turkish firms in various defense programs and exports.60 The boost of these exports is reflective 
in the following graph extracted from SIPRI’s database on financial value of the global arms trade.  
The graph represents Turkey’s financial value of national arms exports from the period of 2009-
2017. As mentioned earlier, the boost of exports from 2012-2016 can be observed, to rise from 
$1,200 million to $1,678 million. 61 As compared to the strategic plan for 2012-2016, the strategic 
plan for 2017-2021 focused on ‘technological depth and global efficiency’. Whereas, the period 
between 2018-2022 has been characterized by ‘technology and sub-systems ownership to facilitate 
a sustainable industry’ in order to boost Turkish military and exports.  
 Another factor that has enabled Turkey to play an important part in global arms race is their 
successful combat records during Syria campaigns, e.g. Operation Euphrates Shield allowing 
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Turkey to present a broad range of arms like the multiple launch rocket systems, UAVs and 
helicopters. This has led to the creation of a warfare environment in Turkey, shaped into a national 
pride narrative. 62  
 
 
Figure 13: Turkey's Financial Value of National Arms Exports 2009-2017 
 
The military might environment has further advance Turkey’s defense initiatives. Thus, despite 
Turkey being a formal NATO ally, it has stepped into heavy defense trade. Ankara’s move to 
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purchase the Russia S-400s had been taken highly objectionable by the U.S since the technology 
did not only threaten Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jets but also was a symbolic representation 
of a long-term alliance between Russia and Turkey. The alliance was alarming and to some extent 
threatening for the U.S national security especially because of Turkey’s geographical location.63 
 The Turkish defense market will have a great impact in the future due to the S-400 
procurement. The SAM (surface-to-air-missile) purchase by Turkey will allow Russia to gain an 
important share in global arms exports. Figure 15 shows that since the S-400 deal has been 
finalized, JSC Almaz Antey, a major Russian arms company is expected to hold ‘more than 13% 
supplier share in the Turkish weapons market’. 64 The arm-deal is of key significance since it is 
between a NATO and non-NATO member. Considering Turkey borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran 
it is questionable to what extent will Moscow exercise its power derived from this defense 
partnership? The role of NATO in this aspect is also of key concern. This research in the next 
section will further address the dynamics of NATO, its future and implications for U.S military 
presence in Europe.  
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Figure 14: Turkey weapons supplier share by value 
 
Moreover, the case of Turkey and purchase of S-400 symbolize United States force posture 
as a tool that does not yield the results expected. In the case of Turkey too, it was observed how 
U.S threat of sanctions had gone quite useless and Turkey managed to pursue its purchase. Not 
only has Turkey paved its way to strengthen its ties with Russia, but Kremlin has been able to 
utilize its military might to extend its influence. The sale of S-400 allows Russia to dominate and 
shape the Turkish foreign policy to a great extent, which will hamper and widen the difference 
between U.S and Turkey. Russia’s strong hold in an important NATO country is alarming for the 
United States and its bilateral ties with Turkey specifically in the context of Turkey’s support in 
Syria, Iran and Venezuela.  
Moscow’s strategic foothold in a key NATO country, and complicates U.S. efforts to gain 




and further explore its use of force posture, in the case of Turkey U.S could use diplomacy and 
negotiations considering that Turkey provided assurance to the U.S about the lack of threats S-400 
would have posed to the F-35 program. 
  The case of Turkey also represents the political economy of national security as explained 
in the literature review. The economic-military nexus presents an interlinkage between 
international conflict and economic interests. Together the combination shapes the position of the 
United States national security and its positioning in the security environment. Conflicts are fueled 
by economic interests and trade agreements, which is reflective in the case of U.S, Turkey and 
Russia. The politics of economic interests decides the possibility of territorial expansion and 
foreign aggression. 65 
Turkey as a case-study presents the erosion of the United States global military domination 
in respect to how U.S exercised its power in the past, whereas in today’s world order other 
competitors exercise equal power which limits the prospect of a single superpower with the 
strongest military industrial base. Therefore, even though the United States is the number one 










Future of NATO – Military Implications for the United States in Europe  
 
United States and Turkey both are NATO members with very different interests and values. 
Initially Turkey was an important ally in terms of curbing communist expansionism. But, in the 
light of recent events Turkey has turned down its NATO ally's pressure and has established a 
partnership with Russia including the acquisition of air defense system, symbolizing a defense 
collaboration between a non-NATO and NATO member. 
Turkey's relations with its NATO members has been under scrutiny due to various reasons. 
Denying U.S troops access to their territory in the Iraq War followed by the strained relations it 
shares with its other NATO member, Greece. The most serious contention and clash with NATO 
is Turkey's purchase of S-400 and the growing relationship with Russia. Is Turkey shifting its 
foreign policy approach from a Western-based alliance to a more Eastern-based alliance? NATO 
is an organization aimed at collective defense in the face of common values and shared threat 
perception. But, are Turkey's interests and threats common to those of other NATO members? 66 
Turkey-US relations are equally important as is US-NATO relations. The purchase of S-
400 has been a serious problem between U.S and Turkey which has been further translated into a 
'NATO problem'. At the same time, the eroding U.S military dominance accompanied by Trump's 
critical approach towards NATO creates a vacuum in the European security affairs. While Trump 
highlights the issue of NATO's defense spending and glorifies the 'America First' approach and 
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overall generally disregards international organizations it is questionable whether Russia is 
provided with an open field to fill in the vacuum?  
With the current U.S stance on NATO alliance the future of NATO in terms of U.S military 
presence in Europe and how that impacts Russia's positioning is contentious. The shifting security 
environment throughout the years has observed U.S and Western Europe's alliance to remain 
constant. However, Trump's outlook towards NATO and its policies could alter the partnership 
thus, resulting into a free space for opponents to take the lead.  While the debate on U.S approach 
towards NATO remains relevant, it is significant to analyze whether NATO would survive within 
an international order in which the U.S dominance is in decline, and at the same time Trump's 
policies restrict added resources to the alliance. Much of this depends on the U.S elections and 
whether Trump would be re-elected, and more than that if the U.S policies towards NATO remain 
stagnant.  
In the case of Trump’s re-election or Trump policies continuation, European security 
environment would be greatly impacted. NATO would face multiple security challenges, ranging 
from weakened support by the United States to member states increasing partnership with Russia 
and weakening of internal cooperation. While these challenges are inevitable European countries 
will be pressured to take ownership of their own security thus, the role of NATO would weaken, 
allowing Russia to avail the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. 67 
Finally, despite the odds of a disintegration of NATO even if Trump-approach towards 
NATO is reformed in future the organization would still face various challenges. In the event of 
 





these confrontations and the changing international order with rising powers like China and Russia 
threatening the United States of America will indeed require an active role in European security. 
With the active support by the United States and boosting resources into NATO the tectonic shifts 
in the balance of power within Europe could be sustained and restored which would be a win-win 
strategy for the stability of U.S and Europe. 68 
 
2. India  
 
India was the fourth biggest military spender in 2018. 60% of the global military spending 
included United States, China, Saudi Arabia and France and India. Figure 16 derived from SIPRI’s 
military expenditure database exhibits the top 15 countries with the highest share of world military 
expenditure in 2018, representing India’s fourth position at 3.7%.  This reflects its role within the 
global military industrial complex in terms of holding a position next to global and regional 
powers.  It further increased its military spending by 3.1% since 2011. With a spending worth 
$66.5 billion, and an increased military expenditure from 2009-2018 to 29% is contemplative of 
India’s role in the global defense industry. 69 
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Figure 15: Share of world military expenditure of the 15 countries 
 
  Despite the existing political environment between India and Russia, it is important to 
examine the past trends between both countries. As compared to India-U.S. defense ties, the year 
2014 witnessed stagnation between India and Russia arms trade whereas, the U.S arms exports to 
India were soaring high. As taken from SIPRI’s arms transfer database, the figure 17 shows in 
trend indicator values (TIV) the drastic fall of Russian arms exports to India and rising U.S arms 




remains a top supplier of arms to India.70 During the period 2010-2014 Russia was observed to 
dominate the Indian defense market by 70%. 71  
 
 
Figure 16: Russia's Arms Exports to India 2008-2018 
 
Russia’s defense sector has enjoyed a buyer-seller partnership with India through various 
joint ventures. The 20th India-Russia annual summit that took place in 2019 marked great 
significance for both countries, as they have agreed to prepare a ‘framework for cooperation on 
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reciprocal logistics support’. This will thus allow both countries to utilize each other’s naval and 
air bases. Furthermore, India would initiate in manufacturing of spare parts for the latter’s military 
carried out through transfer of technology and joint ventures. Russia’s extended assistance and 
support to Indian defense industry raises various questions for U.S-India partnership in terms of a 
force-posture adopted by the United States. With the changing dynamic world order, and India’s 
independent foreign policy cannot be underestimated. 72   
The defense collaboration between India and Russia is highly valuable to India. The 2014 
stagnation between the two countries can be regarded as merely a fluctuation. This slight 
fluctuation was in fact followed by the annual summit in 2016 which incorporated the supply of 
S-400 missile system, and an added ‘four Admiral Grigrovich-class frigates. 73 These deals were 
finalized last year along with the deal for the manufacture of Kamov Ka-226T helicopters. 74 The 
Indian army has ordered 135 of Kamov Ka-226T helicopter whereas, the Indian Airforce has 
placed an order for 65 of these helicopters too. 75 
The S-400 are a great deal within the global security environment. The contract was signed 
in October 2018 between Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Modi. The S-400 deal 
is worth $5.43 billion which also incorporates the delivery of 5 regiments of the missile system. 
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The S-400 possess the capability to operate from surface to bring down enemy aircraft thus, India’s 
purchase of S-400 will highly equip the Indian Air Force. However, the S-400 deal is crucial to 
U.S-India relationship. The United States can exercise its power of sanctions under the domestic 
law using the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act CAATSA, which allows 
any country to be imposed with sanctions based on their trade with Russia, North Korea or Iran.76  
India’s geographical position is another key factor that plays in its foreign policy decisions. 
Sharing borders with China and Pakistan poses a great threat and pressures the need to advance its 
military and air force therefore, the purchase of S-400 is a symbolic representation of India’s 
defense autonomy within the global defense industry. It will further provide India’s defense with 
an added advantage since its air force is already short of squadrons due to aging Russian aircrafts. 
It requires 42 squadrons in a possible war with China or Pakistan. 77 Considering all the benefits 
India will enjoy, the S-400 seems to be a fair deal. But, on the other hand in terms of its political-
security dynamics with the United States a cost-benefit analysis is necessary. What does the future 
hold for U.S-India relationships considering, its deal with Russia - a global U.S competitor?   
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Figure 17: Trend of US and Russian Imports to India 2013-2018 
 
India’s case-study in this research emphasizes the long-based partnership it has with 
Russia, specifically based on its defense trade. Apart from the defense ties, both countries also 
share partnership in various multilateral organizations that provide cooperation such as the G20, 
RIC, East Asia Summit. Moreover, Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council provides 
India with an edge on multiple regional tensions including the Kashmir issue with Pakistan which 
is of great political importance to India.  
In the changing world order the security dynamics require states to reconsider its 
positioning with other countries. In the case of India, it has a strategic decision to make considering 
its dependent relationship with China, a growing regional power with an already established 












































influence in Asia, Russia would be able to gain a lot by building out closer ties than it already has 
with India. The balancing of powers within the region is key, however, in the entire bridging of 
partnerships within the region, the United States is the least considered by India. Despite India 
enjoying great economic-defense ties with the United States it is evident that India would highly 
benefit from reforming its policy to a more open approach to Russia in the Indo-Pacific context. 
But the policy formulation and implementation would inevitably face backlash from the United 
States. It is also important to note that Russia has explicitly elaborated its policy to be multi-vector 
rather than establishing an alliance with China. 78 
However, in the context of this security-dilemma there are aspects of key importance to 
global stability. How can the United States curb the strengthening of Russian-Indian partnership? 
What is the possibility of a Sino-Russian world order? The recent Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization led to various debates regarding this possible world order. While multiple sources 
support the impossibility of such an order considering both states past ties exhibit their clashing 
interests, others point out the power of common threat perception and mutual economic and 
political gains that a Sino-Russian world order would yield. 79 Individually neither of the countries 
can pose a great threat to the western world as the latter is successful in strategizing the 
containment of Chinese and Russian power. The case of a Sino-Russian world order is the only 
possibility for a creation of a block that would be able to challenge and further, heavily compete 
with the western world. Thus, either both states can adopt a competing approach in Central Asia 
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or an approach of cooperation to alter the existing international order, which means a collision 
with American unilateralism. Strengthening partnership between two Cold-War rivals would be a 
win-win situation for India within the region and globally. 
The security dilemma in terms of what the future holds for India, China, Russia, United 
States highly depends on the growing strategic partnerships with these growing powers. India has 
always been a U.S defense partner however, Pakistan being a U.S ally and more recently its 
intensified economic-military partnership with China poses a great threat to India thus, India’s 
move to extend deepened ties with either China or Russia is foreseeable within the region. On the 
other hand, current U.S-Indian alignment gap has been observed therefore, the process of non-
alignment between U.S and India can be predicted. Last but not the least, India’s non-alignment 
policy is a historical key feature of its system that till date is relevant in order to maintain Indian 
sovereignty and oppose imperialism. Its non-alignment policy is also reflected in its defense trade 
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Chapter 5: Analysis  
I. Implication of China’s military expansion  
China’s case-study provides data on heavy economic investment however, the case of 
Djibouti and Iran within China’s case-study covers China’s military interests. Furthermore, the 
expanded economic investment in various countries allows China to grow its role as a major arms 
dealer. The culture of economic investment and dependency created by China is translating into 
strategic-defense partnership with the recipient countries.   
According to SIPRI, China has a massive defense budget which is estimated to be $250 
billion in 2018. China’s Ministry of National Defense concluded in 2018 that its budget rose to 
8.1% year over year. However, it is key to note, SIPRI and Pentagon’s findings are similar that 
China’s estimates lack several expenditures and procurement projects therefore, the existing 
growth is inaccurate. 81 There is a possibility, the limited nature of China’s defense projects and 
release of information is contributing to a greater competition for the United States. Absence of 
transparency and release of defense projects information is a possibility of further economic-
military expansionist agenda.  
While China is competing with top arms dealer such as United States and Russia it is 
important to observe the recipients of China's sales. Many of these customers are also China's Belt 
Road Initiative partners therefore, allowing China to have an easy access in posing itself as an 
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alternative to Russia and the United States of America as a defense trading partner. The BRI 
partners are not only a potential market for Chinese arms exports, but they are also an open field 
for China to exercise its military power. An example of this is Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh 
that have received China's top arms exports since 2007. All three countries are China's BRI 
participant countries and thus, the role of China's global development strategy and its sales within 
the global defense market are interconnected.  
Furthermore, it is significant to identify what the BRI partners offer to China in terms of 
maximizing their arms sales in these countries. Firstly, selling arms to BRI partners is cost efficient 
for China. Secondly, it allows China to improve security environment in these countries by 
dubbing it as 'securing Chinese investments through the utilization of PLA. Iran is an example of 
how China is deploying its forces in the name of protecting economic investments. Thus, with low 
cost and minimized spending the active involvement of PLA in these BRI countries is possible 
further allowing an economic dependency by recipient countries pushing for acquisition of 
Chinese arms. 82 
Considering these shifts, it is questionable, to what extent is the Belt Road Initiative using 
its economic power to expand its global military presence? Is the future of BRI a threat to the 
United States in terms of military expansionism? Various debates have circled around about the 
Belt Road Initiative having military ambitions. In the case of Pakistan, it was observed to take a 
military turn in terms of investing $ 62 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
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narrowing the development to a Chinese-built seaport in Gwadar symbolizing the future use of 
this sea route that connects to Arabia sea. The Gwadar port would yield potential militarized 
benefits in the light of establishing maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region. 83  
Gwadar port's strategic location in terms of being only 107 miles from Chabahar port in 
Iran has multiple implications too. While China develops the Gwadar port, India advances in 
laying the foundations of Chabahar, calling out for a 'New Great Game in South Asia' with regional 
powers aggressively moving towards the establishment of strong maritime presence within the 
region. Chinese economic investments in this cannot be analyzed in isolation. As compared to the 
case of Iran, China is highly interested in the security of its workers and resources in CPEC projects 
thus, pushing for PLA presence to provide safety. Despite this, Pakistan initiating a Special 
Security Division comprising of 15,000 personnel for the purpose of protection, the Gilgit-
Baltistan dam construction case reflects that eventually the People’s Liberation Army soldiers are 
deployed to ensure security. 84  
This research analyzes the pattern of Chinese economic investments to be tied with the 
deployment of PLA in the name of ensuring security whereas, the military presence within Iran, 
Pakistan and Djibouti can have long-term strategic implications. The security environment in 
South Asia will be governed by Chinese influence if prolonged military presence is observed. 
Furthermore, Chinese expansionism is not only limited to South Asia, in addition to the growing 
major arms deal it is boosting its military expenditure too. China's defense budget in 2018 
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estimated to nearly $250 billion according to SIPRI; securing a second position right after the 
United Sates. Despite China's defense budget growth slowing, the country does not plan to reduce 
its defense budget. The Ministry of National defense pointed out the expected budget for military 
spending to rise by 7.5% to $117.6 billion; this would make '2019 the fourth consecutive year of 
single-digit budget growth'. As compared to the United States military expenditure which has 
witnessed fluctuations, China's military expenditure has been on a consecutive rise since 1998.  85 
(see figure 18) Based on the findings within the case-study, China’s military expansionism behind 
the curtain of global development projects is a major threat to U.S global influence.  
 
 
      Figure 18: Military Expenditure (USA-China; 1989-2018) 
  
 





II. Implication of Russia’s Military Expansion  
To what extent can Russia compete with the United States in the global defense market? 
Despite Russia holding the second position as the largest arms exporter, the gap between the United 
States and Russia’s arms exports is quite wide. U.S exports were 36% of the global total between 
2014-2018. On the other hand, as shown in figure 19 Russian arms exports decreased by 17% 
between the same period. 86 Thus, Russia’s second position after the United States as an arms 
exporter is relative since its growth rate increase or decrease reflects the extent it can compete with 
the U.S. Nonetheless, it is crucial to observe whether this decrease is a short-term fluctuation or a 
long-term pattern of decrease.  
 
 
Figure 19: Changes in volume of major arms exports since 2009-2013 by the 10 largest exporters in 2014-2018 
 
 





Facts exhibit that the decrease in arms exports were significantly impacted by diminishing 
Indian and Venezuelan arms imports, both being main customers of Russian imports. Russian 
imports by India dropped by 42% between the 2014-2018 period whereas, Venezuelan arms 
exports dropped by 96% in the same period. While this period records a fluctuation in arms exports 
between Russia and its main customers, other countries are observed to take place to some extent. 
55% of Russian arms exports were received by India, China and Algeria. China and Algeria both 
are not Russia’s main customers therefore, a reduction in Indian imports was compensated through 
selling to other countries though, the growth was still seen in negative.  
Regionally, Russia also expanded its customer base by selling 60% of its arms exports to 
states in Asia and Oceania. The period between 2009-2013 and 2014-2018 recorded an increase 
of 19% in Russian arms exports to the Middle East. Within the Middle East, Iraq and Egypt were 
the main recipients account falling for 46 and 36 percent of arms exports by Russia.  
Currently, Russian market share in Turkey’s defense industry has also taken strength since 
2018, therefore considering the Russian case-study it is evident that despite the role of U.S 
sanctions hampering Russia’s arms sales to other countries, its decrease in arms exports for a 
specific period is just a short-term fluctuation. Russia is exploring to trade its arms with other 
countries other than India and Venezuela. Some of these countries were previously important U.S 
allies such as Turkey, a NATO member. Therefore, the future trajectory of Russian arms sales can 
be regarded as diversified and expanding into various other regions. With a new diversified 
approach, cost-effective arms with lesser conditions attached by Russia is in all spheres competing 
with the United States of America. It is also further posing great challenges to the global military 
advantage of the United States in Europe, and by adjusting its defense trade with global trends and 




What the Russian arms offer that the U.S arms do not? 
Russia is a key competitor of the United States in terms of arms trade within the global 
armament industry. The reasons why Russian arms seem a good option for countries is because 
they either do not enjoy a healthy political relation with the West, and thus deem Russia as an 
alternative, or lack the adequate amount of budget for attaining modernized military equipment. 
Based on two of these broadly categorized reasons the Russian arms offer a lot more that interplays 
with their positioning as second largest arms exporter.  
 Some key elements that allow Russia’s arms to be attractive for many countries are first, 
in the late Soviet phase a well-established military-technological base had been developed which 
allowed the basis for Russian weapons exports. Some of these include Su-30MK family of fighter 
jets, T-90 main battle tanks, and the S-300 SAM systems line. Second, Russian arms compared to 
American arms are less expensive, provide easy operation and meet the needs of the technological 
demands of developing nations.87 Within the U.S defense industry Lockheed Martin makes the 
THAAD, (Terminal High Altitude Area defense; an American anti-ballistic missile defense 
system) and its battery rings cost about $3 billion. Raytheon, another major U.S company makes 
the Patriot system (surface-to-air missile system) and its battery costs $1 billion. If these are 
compared to the Russian S-400 (long-range surface-to-air missile system) that cost roughly $500 
million, it is evident that the cost variation gives Russia a lead over American arms. Recently, after 
Turkey has purchased the S-400, various countries have shown interest in purchasing the Russian 
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S-400, reflecting the potential competition rise for U.S. 88 Third, unlike U.S arms and the string 
attached with them, the Russian offer arms without conditionalities, therefore allowing easy 
transfer of technology without political and economic constraints. Fourth, the Russian arms are an 
easy export with an added benefit of provision of broad category of different arms which include 
some technologically and militarily ‘game-changer’ ones, such as the SS-26 Iskandar short-range 
ballistic missiles, and the S-400 SAM systems. Lastly, the Russian defense markets is better 
equipped at offering advanced after-sales service for the equipment sold along upgrades. 89 
 In my view, out of the five reasons that boost Russian arms exports provided above, the 
most important and crucial ones in the global defense competition between the two countries is 
the cost-conditionalities nexus. In what I term as the cost-conditionalities nexus, the cost being 
inexpensive Russian arms intertwined with reduced economic and political constraints allows 
countries to prioritized Russian arms over U.S arms.  
The economic-military nexus as mentioned earlier in the literature-review section, is of 
great significance within the global military advantage. The economic forces have a profound 
impact on countries and their defense policy decisions in terms of how they select their trading 
partners and gives way for countries to explore a more diversified approach. This approach further 
also focuses on, avoiding to place all strategic eggs in the American basket. The economic-military 
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nexus has a direct relation with U.S force posture in terms of the economic limitations that come 
along with their exports. If these cost-conditionalities constraints stop acting as a trade barrier for 
countries to export U.S arms, the defense competition environment would look quite different.  
The case-study on Turkey and India within this research address the direct and indirect 
relationship with the cost-conditionalities nexus. In the case of Turkey, this thesis examines to 
what extent has the role of cost and conditionalities impacted the U.S-Turkey relations. It has 
further investigated, whether there are other factors involved in the recent developing military ties 
between Russia and Turkey. The case of India has been analyzed to assess the positioning of its 
arms exports with Russia and America as global competitors while it holds a U.S-ally tag.  
 
Chapter 6: Causes of The Erosion of U.S Military Advantage  
The United States diminishing global military advantage, presence and influence is 
intertwined with multiple factors. These factors can be divided into two sets, the internal factors 
and external factors. The internal factors vary from reduced competition, mergers and 
consolidation and prioritized corporate interests over national security interests. Whereas the 
external factors range from U.S force posture hampering its military dominance, Sino-Russian 
competition, and smaller states broadening their defense trading programs leading to shifts in 
global defense trade and formation of new regional alliances.  
This section explores two most important factors, once each from internal and external 
category. Firstly, the United States force posture in terms of sanctions and too many strings 




industry. Each factor is analyzed to further explain its impact on the loss in global military forte. 
The internal competition further identifies other factors contributing to the erosion of global 
military edge whereas, the force posture factor is explored in the context of how the United States 
loses its defense trading partners to its competitors like Russia and China.  
 
a. Force posture; the problem of sanctions and too many strings attached with military 
sales 
The purpose of this section in the research is to address the ineffectiveness of sanctions in 
reference to defense trade. The frequent and over use of sanctions is becoming problematic in 
today's multipolar world. How impactful are United States sanctions in bringing about political 
outcomes? 
The use of sanctions as derived from the United States force posture has multiple political 
implications for the country in the context of how it exercises its military advantage. These 
sanctions vary in nature, whether they’re on a single individual like the Mexican drug lord ‘El 
Chapo’ or entire governments like Iran. The role, extent and nature of these sanctions is an 
important aspect of whether they yield short and long-term benefits or in fact hamper its 
international standing. This research has explored the case-study of Turkey in terms of the United 
States threats of sanctions in the purchase of S-400 from Russia lacking the ability to act as a 
cudgel sharper. 
The U.S practice of using sanctions has led to some success like the negotiations between 
North Korea and U.S over the nuclear program. But, at the same time sanctions have faced 




interests for example, restrictions on trading with Iran or Russia. Such sanctions lead to strained 
relations with countries, but more so the question of what is the risk of sanction for the long-term 
stability of the United States in the global world order is relevant? Has the use of sanctions to 
impact the achievement of specific policy goals failed? 90 
In the recent light of events, Turkey was followed by India to consider buying the S-400 
from Russia. Various public articles and reports highlight the possibility of U.S sanctions placed 
if India decides to carry out the acquisition. Despite India’s move to consider purchase of S-400 
raising questions regarding its future military and defense trajectory, it is more important to 
identify that the aggressive force posture of the United States is undermining its long-term 
economic, defense and foreign policy strength rather than resulting in favorable results. 91 
The U.S force posture which is reflected in its aggressive stance in matters of defense in 
the form of excessive sanctions is damaging its political and diplomatic reputation thereby, 
creating an open field for countries to adhere to their national security interests and pursue defense 
partnerships with U.S competitors. The weakening impact of the sanctions further translates into 
diminishing diplomatic and political pressure in the field of defense equipment acquisitions, 
resulting in the added erosion of United States global military influence. 
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b. Internal competition in United States Defense Industry  
The United States defense industry has a domination over the share of global arms sales. U.S 
is the largest defense spender, holding a budget of over $586.7 billion in 2017. It is further expected 
to sustain its superiority within the global defense market. The defense expenditure is forecasted 
to increase at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of more than 5.7% reaching to $798 billion 
by 2022. 92  The U.S defense monopoly is provided by the top defense companies based in the US. 
These firms are the top producers of major global weapons ranging from hypersonic missiles to 
fighter jets and combat ships. In 2017 top 100 companies made weapons sales worth $398.2 billion 
which was a third-year continuous growth of the industry.  
However, it is important to note the U.S companies and defense industry is not monolithic 
thus, faces global competition. The world’s top 10 defense firms that account fall for the growth 
in 2017 included, one Russian company; Almaz-Antey that made $8.6 billion worth of arms sales 
(see figure 20) followed by, one British company; BAE systems making $22.9 billion of arms 
sales. Three European companies combined for $29.2 billion of arms sales which included 
Leonardo, Thales and Airbus Group. The remaining five are U.S based companies; General 
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. These companies 
comprised a total of $137.6 billion of arms sales whereas, the Russian, British and European 
comprise arms sales of $60.7 billion. 93 Figure 22 shows that out of these top ten companies, 30% 
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share is of non-U. S companies, thus reflecting the contribution to arms sales which further 
translates into United States defense industry being heavily competed with. One of the competitors 
is Almaz-Antey, a Russian arms production company. Therefore, the Russian penetration in the 
global arms market gives rise to higher competition for the U.S market. 
 
 




























Figure 21: Top Ten Global Defense Contractors 
 
 
To compare the top five U.S based companies, Lockheed Martin made maximum sales, 
worth $44.9 billion thus, reflecting domination within the U.S defense industry. It has the first 
position within U.S defense industry comprising of 32.6% of total sales whereas, Boeing holds the 
second position with a 19.5% share. However, the gap between both companies has increased from 
11% billion in 2016 to $18 billion in 2017, thus, reflecting Lockheed Martin's continuous growth 
and monopoly within the U.S defense market. Other companies together have a share of 47.6%; 
Raytheon 17.3%, Northrop Grumman 16.2% and General Dynamics 14.1%. With the above 





















largest arms producer with arms sales of $44.9 billion in 2017 alone. 94 But that does not translate 
into absolute monopoly since within the U.S defense industry it faces challenges from other 
companies whereas, globally it has major competitors too.  
This paper traces back the section on risk factors impacting the U.S industrial base that 
expanded the dynamics of competition with competitors, respectively with China however, the 
research now elaborates the impact of internal competition within the U.S defense industry. What 
does Lockheed Martin’s monopoly say about the United States internal competition? Is the United 
States defense industry monolithic?  
The report on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base 
and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States outlines various factors of the decline of the U.S 
defense industry in terms of its manufacturing capabilities and capacity. Some of these factors 
include loss in manufacturing workforce, offshoring of manufacturing and reduced technical 
innovation. But one of the main factors that is quite significant in shaping the erosion of military 
advantage is the pattern of diminishing competition internally within the defense industry. 
Whereas, globally the erosion is characterized by the rise of competition due to other competitors 
infiltrating the market. The opposite shifts in internal-external competition for the U.S defense 
industry will eventually lead to intensified military erosion and contribute to the United States 
defense industry being impacted in terms of weapons sales and share, as well as in power 
exercising. 95 
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 The internal competition within the U.S defense industry is based on various reasons, 
ranging from company mergers to decline in the manufacturing base. A specific example of this 
is the shipbuilding sector which carries out naval equipment construction and maintenance. The 
equipment includes, aircrafts, submarines, weapons and command control systems. 6 out of 10 
industries within the naval shipbuilding sector were in the manufacturing sector, but these 
industries faced a drop-down in 2000 of over 20,500 U.S establishments due to the global shift in 
industrial base. Till the 2000s China held a share of 15% in global machine tool consumption, but 
by 2011 its share increased to 40% of the global total. Such external shifts and challenges absorbed 
by the U.S defense industry limit the capacity of the industry's production and long-term growth, 
hampering not only the U.S economy but also weakening its global position in terms of its military 
edge. 96 
Furthermore, within the internal competition the problem of monopoly, company mergers 
and controlled government contracts heighten the erosion of global military supremacy. The 
history of Lockheed’s merger with Martin in 1995, and later in 2015 the $9 billion acquisition of 
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation reflects the monopolization of the industry internally thus, facing 
greater challenges in the global market. Mergers and consolidation amplify the reduction in 
competition, innovation and military advancement.97 Between 1993 and 2000, the number of prime 
contractors dropped down from 50 to 6 that took advantage of team bids to government contracts, 
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threatening competition and military edge negatively. 98 With such great size and concentration, 
power is misused, and corporate advantage is placed above national security interest.  
 While the United States government heavily relies on single sourced contract route thus, 
raising the question of clash between corporate and national security interests. It is observed that 
the government is hostage to one company, Lockheed Martin thus, undermining its democratic 
values. Lockheed Martin’s 2018 annual report mentions that 70% of their net sales were derived 
from government contracts, whereas 60% were from the department of defense (DoD).  The 
company further expected to boost its sales from government contracts which are provided based 
on the continued ‘Congressional appropriations’. 99 
Together all these factors represent how diminishing competition and diversification can 
further raise costs and hamper innovation, thus ending into amplified erosion of global military 
might. Another recent news observed in the defense industry is about the merging of Raytheon 
and United Technologies Corporation’s defense division. This will further threaten the decreased 
military might of the country. 100 In order to maintain the existing global military power, it is 
important for the country to control concentration, mergers, eroding innovation and reduced 
competition. Sustenance of the United States military-industrial complex is subject to firstly, 
 
98 Gregory Sanders and Zach Huitink, “Evaluating Consolidation and the Threat of Monopolies within 
Industrial Sectors,” Evaluating Consolidation and the Threat of Monopolies within Industrial Sectors | Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS Defense Industrial Initiative Group, November 6, 2019), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/evaluating-consolidation-and-threat-monopolies-within-industrial-sectors) 
99 “Lockheed Martin Corporation 2018 Annual Report,” Lockheed Martin, accessed November 4, 2019, 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/annual-reports/2018-annual-
report.pdf) 
100 Mark Thompson, “The Incredibly Shrinking Defense Industry,” Project on Government Oversight, 





prioritizing national security concerns above corporate interests and secondly promote a diverse 
and dynamic defense industrial base with heightened competition in the context of winning 
government contracts.  
 
Chapter 7: Is There A Way Back? 
There are various interconnected conditions that apply to the case of whether the United States 
can lead its way back to the return of its global military supremacy. There are multiple reasons that 
may or may not favor the U.S to establish a dominating global military power in the international 
order. The findings of this thesis determine the challenges for U.S global military edge. These 
challenges include the following set of internal and external factors: 
 
Internal Factors  
 
1. The United States defense strategy  
 
The United States defense strategic concept is under scrutiny considering its force posture 
and the implications it has for the changing new world order. Its force posture as mentioned in its 
Defense Strategy of 2018 in fact limits the goal of ‘preserving peace through strength’ and 
curbing the ‘eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets’  
 
‘A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust 




balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force 
posture, alliance and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the 
capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.’ 101 
 
America’s force posture has helped throughout the years for difficult negotiations; ranging 
from its war on terrorism to restricting countries from nuclear proliferation and shaping alliances 
on its own terms. But, the existing fluctuations within the security environment whereby, the U.S 
identifies global competitors like China and Russia; regional competitors like Iran and North 
Korea, and finally terrorist networks as a major threat poses different kind of risks to the American 
national security. Today the United States faces a set of challenges, very different from the past; 
countering shifts in Indo-Pacific, Europe and threats faced by terror networks.  
Considering the changing nature of international landscape, the use of force posture and hard 
policy in terms of sanctions, lethal force, preserving peace by strength will neither ‘strengthen 
alliances’ nor ‘attract new partners.’ Iran’s current status of resuming uranium enrichment, 
Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 and India’s potential to acquire the S-400 despite threat of U.S 
sanctions are examples that reflect the U.S policies based on force posture towards international 
order does not have the same output as it did in the past. If anything, the current strategy will yield 
more damaging results in the form of disintegration of alliances and erosion of military 
partnerships.  
The United States defense strategy’s scope, objectives, outlined policies and approach will 
play an important part in whether the United States can pave its way back in terms of the eroding 
 





global military edge. A shift in force posture into a more cooperative strategy defined by 
partnership, competition and strengthening alliances through diplomacy and negotiations would 
be favorable in sustaining the United States military might and influence within the global security 
order. 
 
2. United States defense industry’s declining manufacturing base  
 
U.S declining defense base is triggered by monopoly, company mergers and controlled 
government contracts.  As explained earlier in the research, the internal competition in the United 
States defense industry is subject to extreme centralization and mergers; Lockheed Martin alone 
has 32.6% of arms sales, holding first position in the industry whereas, Boeing holds the second 
position with 19.5% worth of arms sales. 102 This reflects how more than 50% share of U.S defense 
industry is in control of two companies. As identified by the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial 
Base report one of the main causes of a declining industrial base is the loss of capabilities and 
capacities thus, impacting a healthy competition within the industry.  
Furthermore, centralization has further aggravated declining prime contractors which dropped 
from 50 to 6 therefore, exhibiting a tight control on government contracts. Limited contractors 
provided to the government prioritize corporate interests over national security interests as 
observed in Lockheed Martin’s pattern of deriving 70% of its net sales from government contracts 
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in 2018. 103 However, the monopolization within the industry does not by any means represent the 
monolithic nature of the U.S defense industry, as internal loss of competition is the triggering 
factor for other competitor nations challenging U.S industrial base.  
The declining innovation and manufacturing base within the U.S defense industry can 
eventually lead to higher competition posed by China and Russia, translating into the further 
erosion of U.S military control. On the other hand, addressing the issue of centralization, controlled 
government contracts and monopoly can allow the U.S to counter the process of erosion and 
declining influence. 
 
External Factors  
 
3. Increased market share of the United States competitors 
 
The United States defense industry faces extreme competition by regional opponents mainly, 
China and Russia. China's conventional arms sales rose to $645 million to $1.04 billion from 2008 
to 2018. 75% of these exports went to Asia while 20% went to Africa. Mostly Chinese arms exports 
recipients are neighboring countries however, it still accounts fall for an increased market share 
aggressively competing with the United States. 104  
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Considering Russia's defense industry, recent shifts have been observed in terms of 
significant growth of Russian defense companies. For the first time, Almaz-Antey; Russia's largest 
arms producing company was ranked with U.S companies in top ten for global arms sales. 
Moreover, Almaz-Antey increased its arms sales to 17% to $ 8.6 billion in 2016. The significant 
growth and infiltration in global arms industry symbolize Russia's military modernization. Other 
growth trends within the Russian defense market are seen with the three Russian firms increasing 
their arms sales more than 15%. United Engine by 25%, High Precision Systems by 33% and 
Tactical Missiles by 19%. Russian companies boosted their arms sales more than 8 % in 2017. 105 
 For the United States to respond to high rise of global defense competition it would require 
boosting innovation and strengthening its defense partnerships. Moreover, it would need to 
overtake the benefits that Russian and Chinese arms offer. The cost-conditionalities factor 
whereby, Russia and China exercise greater leverage with defense trading partners in the context 
of reduced costs and lesser conditions attached to arms sales is a crucial implication for global 
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4. An increased global disorder i.e. growing powers such as China and Russia in terms 
of their expansionist agenda both economically and militarily 
 
a. China’s economic advancement, its Belt and Road Initiative and military 
modernization in Asia, Africa and the Middle East 
 
This thesis expands into China as a case-study to address its economic advancement 
coupled with its military development. The findings within this research include mainly the Belt 
Road Initiative – as an undercover military expansionist project. The first step towards military 
expansion is control of economic tools, which China is seen to be advancing towards. Along 
economic control that China exercises it is militarily advancing through these investments in BRI 
member countries.  
The economic-military nexus plays a key role in the case of China overtaking the United 
States as the number one military spender, allowing the latter to lose its military edge. China’s 
economic investments in Iran, Pakistan and Djibouti as well as various other BRI members is 
paired with military partnership. In the case of Iran, deploying security personnel in the name of 
protection of economic investments, in Pakistan establishing the Gwadar port in a tightly-secured 
environment posing militarized benefits in terms of maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region, 
and lastly Djibouti where China has a naval base symbolizing a defense policy shift.  
The collaborated economic-military efforts define the return of China as a global power in 
the great power politics. This contributes heavily to the United States eroding global military 




influence as compared to the past. China’s policy in developing newer tools to counter U.S remain 
prevalent in terms of military modernization and economic development. As compared to Russia, 
China poses a great threat and risk to the American national security therefore, a policy to deter 
Chinese expansion is a dire need of the present. 
 
b. Russia seeking global hegemony 
 
The return of a global Russia entailing rebuilding of strategic partnerships, expanding 
military base, boosting arms sales with NATO members challenges U.S power across the globe. It 
is important to determine whether Russia is one of the main players in the international order or 
can it replace the United States as a superpower? Considering Russia’s military approach towards 
U.S allies; mainly Turkey and India the findings of this research identify Russia as a defense 
competitor however, in relative terms the military power it is expanding is not to a great extent. 
Almaz Antey has intruded into the global arms sales however, the global share is still small; only 
at 4% therefore, the U.S faces an immediate threat by China in the process of its global military 
erosion rather than Russia. Russia can be regarded as a regional power since much of its customer 
base in terms of arms sales is centered in Asia and Oceania. It has been observed to increase its 
exports in Middle East however, if that narrowed down to mostly to Iraq and Egypt thus the extent 
to which Russia would exercise its influence is contested.  
However, current U.S-NATO relations are in direction conflict with Russia’s positioning. U.S 
policies towards NATO initiate a vacuum creation for Russia to impact U.S influence in Western 




influence thus, impacting European security. Russia can potentially utilize Turkey to weaken U.S 
influence however, at the same time face backlash from other NATO members.  
Lastly, despite the United States identifying Russia as a possible threat it is important to 
consider that a country’s influence is not limited to its military might, and in the case of Russia, 
its economic size, productivity, technology and management skills as well as diplomatic strength 
do not match United States pace. The developments in the arena of science, culture and education 
are all important factors which Russia still lags far behind.  
 
5. Re-emergence of strategic partnerships and shifting of alliances impacting regional 
and global stability  
 
Aggressive regional challengers - North Korea, Turkey and Iran are broadening their military 
partnership with the United States global competitors, mainly Russia and China. The reemergence 
of these powers is leading to a shift in the existing alliances whereby, these states are establishing 
regional blocs to threaten American interests and global influence. Mutual interests include 
competitor states expanding their military capabilities to replace the U.S as a global power, and 
regional powers benefiting from diversifying their defense interests; both striving towards exerting 
greater pressure on U.S. While China and Russia exercise power on U.S alliances, smaller states 
find this as an opportunity to skillfully rise out of American influence.  
The change in geopolitical ambitions is a collaborated economic-military effort by global and 
regional powers. The threat the United States faces from Iran will be amplified in the case of a 
China backed Iran. The same case applies to North Korea, in the eventuality of Russia 




together with threats from terrorist networks and a declining global U.S military influence will 
weaken U.S hegemonic status. The rules of international order will be governed by multiple 
competing actors.  
 
Finally, while these above-mentioned factors interplay in determining whether there is a way 
back for the United States to restore its eroding global military power, it is also important to 
identify the measurement of erosion. Therefore, the argument this thesis represents is that the 
erosion of military edge is not in monetary terms.  Thus, the United States can have the highest 
military expenditure and can still be the number one arms exporter, but despite that it is facing an 
erosion of its military advantage. This erosion is calculated in terms of the United States ability to 
perform single-handedly in dictating the rules of international order, its loss of partnerships and 
alliance, its inability to curb competitors from infiltrating the defense industry and finally 





Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 
This thesis is about the United States eroding global military supremacy, and whether it 
can pave its way back to exercising absolute power and influence within the international order. 
To address the question, the research considers Russia and China as a case-study analyzing the 
impact of their military implications and expansionist tendencies on the balance of military edge 
that the U.S exercises globally. It narrows down these case-studies in examining the influence they 
yield within the Middle East, Asia and Africa thus, causing challenges for the U.S in these 
respective regions.  
The research identifies various causes for the erosion which entail firstly, the weakening 
U.S defense industrial base, whereby reduced competition and monopolization leads to controlled 
government contracts - reflecting the prioritization of corporate interests over national security 
interests. The American defense industry is currently controlled by two leading firms, Lockheed 
Martin which holds 32.6% of arms sales, and Boeing with 19.5% worth of arms sales. Lockheed 
Martin specifically derives most of its sales and profits from government contracts, therefore, the 
politicization of the corporate sector is an obstacle in the way of achieving national interests. The 
monopoly of two major companies within the defense industry acts as a barrier to healthy 
competition, innovation and economies of scale. Secondly, the United States defense strategy is 
inefficient in meeting the demands of a new security environment. It lacks the ability to formulate 
policies that match the changing nature of global security and shifting of alliance. The defense 
strategy still implies the traditional power structure which is incompatible with the new emerging 




global power. The absence of economic initiatives, cooperation and forming partnerships based on 
mutual interests is a key in determining the erosion of U.S domination. Thirdly, the research 
highlights U.S force posture as a cause for the reduced domination. The politics of sanctions and 
hard line policies fails to attract new partners rather, causing a break-down of existing strategic 
partnerships. The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian S-400 is analyzed to determine the 
impact of sanctions on nations.  
Lastly, increased inter-state competition in the form of reemergence of China and Russia 
as revisionist powers is yet another cause for the declining U.S military might. Both case-studies 
observed a pattern of utilization of soft power in the form of economic resources, diplomacy and 
negotiations to attain national security interests. Russia and China’s defense strategy vary from the 
U.S defense strategy to a great extent. While the latter prioritizes use of force posture, sanctions, 
lethal force and sanctions, the revisionist powers extend their influence through attracting new 
economic-defense partners. China has successfully developed partnerships with various countries 
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe through its global development project, the Belt Road 
Initiative (BRI). Using the economic gains, it is further expanding its military might and presence 
within member countries. The Belt Road Initiative characterized by debt-trap diplomacy reflects 
to be an undercover military project whereby, China infiltrates into countries while providing 
cheap loans with lesser strings attached. On the other hand, Russia is also extending out defense 
partnerships in the form of arms sales at lesser price with lesser strings attached compared to the 
United States. As both countries continue to pursue their expansionist strategies, the United States 




Therefore, while these tectonic shifts are observed in the global geopolitical landscape, the 
United States would need to adopt a range of strategies to overcome its eroding global military 
dominance and sustain the existing advantage it has. The answer to the research question is 
dependent on the policies that the United States will pursue which then determine whether it can 
pave its way back or face increased erosion.  
While competitor states use military, economic, political and diplomatic tools to challenge the 
United States global military influence, this research suggests a policy shift that can curb 
competition. The strategies the United States can endorse to restore and protect its global military 
power, mainly focus around laying out operational concepts that enable U.S to constraint China, 
Russia and other key states from expanding their sphere of influence. These strategic concepts 
include firstly, U.S translating its force posture into exercising soft power in the form of 
negotiations, large-scale global development projects and creating a culture of dependency in order 
to attain its defense objectives under the cover of soft power. United States defense approach relies 
heavily on deterring regional threats through exercising its power. As compared to China and 
Russia, that are using economic development and defense partnerships to extend this influence. 
The latter do not dictate their terms while negotiating economic-military agreements, whereas, the 
United States economic aid and defense trade comes along with impacting conditions. Recent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid to Pakistan demanded increased scrutiny for debt payable 
to China, and various other conditions attached. Such dimensions compel recipient countries to re-
consider future partnerships.  
Secondly, addressing the inefficiency of U.S defense industry by boosting innovation and 




clash between policy makers and the interests of U.S defense industry since corporate gains are 
given an edge over national security concerns. The problem of monopolization within the defense 
industry that holds a dominant position in acquiring government contracts limits the possibility of 
growth. A conflict of interest within the defense industry and government machinery is observed 
which arises from placing corporate leadership in government roles. A key example of this is the 
case of Patrick Michael Shanahan who served as a senior vice president for Boeing and was also 
a member of the Boeing Executive Council before holding the position as an Acting U.S Secretary 
Defense in 2019. Thus, policy makers give preference to boosting company growth rather than 
industrial innovation.  
Thirdly, promoting U.S arms sales across different regions rather than concentrating sales to a 
specific region contributes to the diminishing global military power. Currently, Saudi Arabia is 
the largest U.S arms importer, thus the U.S would need to diversify its defense market and 
customer base in order to regain its military power. In order to increase and diversify its arms sales, 
the U.S would need to reflect on the cost-conditionalities factor as revealed in this thesis which 
allows Russia and China to absorb U.S market share. Most nations today in an altering security 
setting prefer to purchase arms with less strings attached which the United States does not offer. It 
would be vital to consider whether the United State can sell arms at a reduced price and with lesser 
conditions?   
 The premise in this study states that the United States can pave its way back in reinstating 
its global military strength dependent on the factors provided. Nevertheless, there is still a broader 
debate about firstly, can the United States still fail to defend its global influence despite bringing 




It can shift from a force posture which discourages global hegemony and deters regional threats in 
protecting its own interest to a new strategy characterized by encouraging cooperative international 
community through establishing alliances and using soft power. Nevertheless, it can still fail to 
acquire its previous dominant position. Secondly, another opposing view in the broader discussion 
is that military might, and sales of weapons comes with a burden for the United States policy-
makers. These concerns are in the context of potential for misuse and violation of human rights by 
the general public. Furthermore, the discourse on whether maximizing military power positively 
influences American security or not is also relevant and controversial. Arms sales providing 
security to the American interests is arguable to quite an extent since it’s already existing 
geography, a secure nuclear arsenal and promising economic conditions pose less threat to the 
national security of the U.S.  
On the contrary, in terms of declining influence the role of military might is to a great 
extent positive. Military edge and sales of arms provide an extended sphere of power on nations. 
Therefore, after providing a case for U.S paving its way back and a case against U.S military 
supremacy, the findings of this research concludes and suggests that in order to refrain from 
unstable security environment the United States should reconsider its strategic outlook. 
Encouraging a policy shift by promoting global development initiatives coupled with favorable 
arms sales, strengthening regional alliances, boosting innovation and diversity in its defense 
industry, addressing controlled government contracts, limiting conflicts of interests and building a 
culture of dependency can reestablish its global military domination.  
Despite the United States defense strategy accepting newer challenges and a dire need for 
countering these confrontations, it still lacks a shift of policy in attending to the changing world 




Russian efforts in framing out counter defense strategies and newer models to weaken the U.S 
power. The United States observes the altering patterns in revisionist powers defense strategies 
and lays an emphasis on deterring their rapid expansion, but even then, fails to initiate a newer 
policy. Even today the focus of the strategy symbolizes building lethal force, using coercion, 
modernizing capabilities and winning competition. If the United States wants to restore and sustain 
its existing military might, the need for a strategic change would be inevitable. The future of U.S 
prosperity will be determined by the counter narrative to the reemergence of revisionist powers. 
For the status-quo to alter, a defense strategy fighting the changing nature of war will further shape 
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